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DO CHARTER SCHOOLS THREATEN 
PUBLIC EDUCATION? EMERGING 
EVIDENCE FROM FIFTEEN YEARS OF 
A QUASI-MARKET FOR SCHOOLING 
James Forman, Jr. * 
Governments increasingly rely on private entltles to institute 
educational reforms. This article examines the effects of the most sig-
nificant of these market-based reforms: charter schools. As of the 
2004-2005 school year, the United States boasted over three thousand 
charter schools, with state governments facing continued pressure to 
expand that number. Some critics, however, fear that charter schools 
pose a threat to the traditional public school system. Their central 
concern, generally referred to as "cream-skimming," is that the educa-
tional choice system created by charter schools privileges those stu-
dents and parents whose race, class, or educational background af-
ford them a better position to navigate the market for schools. This 
article will contend that the threat of cream-skimming currently ap-
pears unsubstantiated. Additionally, it will posit that charter schools 
may actually become allies with district schools, potentially aiding in 
efforts to increase educational funding. However, because the re-
forms are so new and the educational landscape is changing in so 
many ways, additional research is necessary to fully ascertain charter 
schools' impact on the traditional public school system. 
INTRODUCTION 
In America, as in much of the world, government increasingly relies 
on nongovernment actors, including private firms, to achieve public ends. 
This has sparked controversy across various sectors, most passionately in 
the field of education. Of the market-based reforms in education, char-
* Associate Professor. Georgetown University Law Center. I am grateful for the comments 
and assistance of the following: the staff of the Edward Bennett Williams Law Library (including Jen-
nifer Davitt. Louise Tsang. and Rhona Williams). Judith Areen. Larry Cuban. Heather Enlow. Arthur 
Evenchik. Chai Feldblum. Wendy Heller. Vicki Jackson. Naomi Mezey. Sarah Molseed. Ifeoma 
Nwokoye. Nina Pillard. Eric Rofes. Constancia Romilly. Mike Seidman. Roselle Singer. Gerry Spann. 
La Toya Sutton. Terry Weber. and most especially the Georgetown "Junior Group" (including Kris 
Henning. Greg Klass. John Mikhail. Nick Rosenkranz. David Vladek. and Kathy Zeiler). 
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ter schools have had the greatest impact. By the 2004-2005 school year, 
there were approximately three thousand charter schools in forty states 
and the District of Columbia, and governments face continued pressure 
to expand that number. I In some cities the pace of growth has been es-
pecially quick: charter schools enroll more than 25% of the students in 
Dayton, Ohio, and almost 25% in Washington, D.C., and Kansas City, 
Missouri.2 
Charter schools-and the market-based arguments often made for 
them-are seen by some as threatening traditional public schools. One 
of the central fears motivating charter skeptics is typically referred to as 
"cream-skimming." A choice system, critics have long suggested, would 
privilege those students and parents whose race, class, or educational 
background give them a better position to navigate the market for 
schools. Similarly, schools would have an incentive to recruit students 
whose educational ability and family backgrounds make them attractive. 
At the end of the day, the traditional public system would be left popu-
lated by the least able children with the least active parents. Thus, even 
if choice benefited individual families, society as a whole, and especially 
disadvantaged families, would suffer. 
The fear of cream-skimming is connected to the other fundamental 
fear of public school supporters-that schools will lose political clout as 
more advantaged families depart from the traditional public system? 
Similarly, some public school supporters worry that charter schools, over 
time, will undermine the legitimacy of public authority and reduce citizen 
engagement on behalf of the public system. Bruce Fuller has suggested 
that "[c]harter school founders-leading their human-scale institutions, 
and, in the aggregate, the charge to decentralize government-may para-
doxically erode the strength of public authority and the very agencies on 
which their local livelihood depends.,,4 Stated more broadly, the ques-
tion is whether charters will tilt the balance toward government for the 
pursuit of individual interests and away from the common good?5 Given 
1. CrR. FOR EDUC. REFORM, NATIONAL CHARTER SCHOOL DATA AT-A-GLANCE (2005), 
available at htlp:llwww.edreform.coml_upload/ncsw-numbers.pdf. For discussions of the future 
growth of charter schools, see Paul T. Hill, Doing School Choice Right, 111 AM. J. EDUC. 141, 141-42 
(2005), and Lisa Snell, Defining the Education Market: Reconsidering Charter Schools, 25 CATO J. 267, 
274 (2005). 
2. HOPES, FEARS, & REALITY: A BALANCED LOOK AT AMERICAN CHARTER SCHOOLS IN 2005 
4 n.6 (Robin J. Lake & Paul T. Hill eds., 2005). 
3. In a widely cited early study of charter schools, Amy Stuart Wells and a team of researchers 
argued that "[olther major equity issues that have been ignored by many of the major advocates of 
charter school reform include charter schools' role at the forefront of marketization and privatization 
of the public education system." UCLA CHARTER SCHOOL STUDY, BEYOND THE RHETORIC OF 
CHARTER SCHOOL REFORM: A STUDY OF TEN CALIFORNIA SCHOOL DISTRICTS 63 (1998) [hereinafter 
UCLA STUDY). The result, they said, "could lead to less political support for public funding of educa-
tion as a whole." Id. 
4. Bruce Fuller, Introduction to INSIDE CHARTER SCHOOLS: THE PARADOX OF RADICAL 
DECENTRALIZATION 1,4 (Bruce Fuller ed., 2000). 
5. In discussing school choice generally, Martha Minow suggests that "schooling is increasingly 
viewed as a private consumption item, instead of a shared experience for children from all classes, 
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the move towards privatization across industries and the hostility of 
many policymakers to a robust state, do charter schools undermine the 
notion that providing high-quality schooling for all children is a core pub-
lic responsibility?6 
Many of the participants in this debate argue with great passion.7 
Alex Molnar, for example, claims that the goal of many powerful charter 
school advocates "is not nearly as caring as their rhetoric. Bluntly put, it 
is to dismember public education and feed off the carcass."x Similarly, 
National Education Association President Reg Weaver warns parents to 
be careful of "the voucherizers, the privatizers, the charterizers who will 
come and try to fool our communities, saying that this is best for your 
kid .... [T]hey're not coming with solutions for all of our children. They 
might be coming with solutions for one or two or three but not for the 
vast majority."9 In many respects the intensity of the debate is predict-
able. After all, if the proper role of government is a matter of great in-
terest to Americans, nowhere is that more the case than with schooling. 
Education has long been viewed as the ultimate guarantor of equal op-
portunity for all Americans and has played a central role in the struggle 
for racial equality.lO 
The intensity of the rhetoric, however, masks the reality that, espe-
cially in the early years, nobody knew the answers to some key questions. 
The first charter law passed in Minnesota in 1991. Because charter 
schools were so new, the absence of data inescapably limited the debate 
in the early years. In the scheme of American educational policy history, 
charter schools are still relatively novel. I do not suggest that we know 
enough today to resolve all the questions I have described. But we do 
have substantial additional data upon which to draw. Charter schools 
have expanded rapidly, and interest from researchers has remained high. 
The last few years especially have seen an outpouring of empirical and 
other research touching on issues central to the charter experiment. 
races. and ethnic backgrounds. Decisions about schooling become a matter of consumer choice rather 
than citizen self-governance or public policy .. ' MARTHA MINOW. PARTNERS. NOT RIVALS: 
PRIVATIZATION AND THE PUBLIC GOOD 52-53 (2002). 
6. See, e.g .. Martha Minow. Parlners. Not Rivals?: Redrawing the Lilies Between PlIhlic and Pri-
vate. Non-Profit and Profit, and SeclIlar and Religious. 80 B.U. L. REV. lO6l. lO82 (2000) ("IBJlurring 
the public/private line can jeopardize any sense of public obligation to provide social services. aid to 
the poor. health care. and even schooling"'). 
7. Hill. supra note 1. at 143 (noting that the choice debate often renects a "struggle between 
those alleging that choice would be an automatic success and those claiming it would be a certain dis-
aster"). 
8. ALEX MOLNAR. GIVING KIDS THE BUSINESS: THE COMMERCIALIZATION OF AMERICA'S 
SCHOOLS 153 (19'16). 
9. News alld Notes with Ed Cordoll. Reg Weaver Oil the NEA's Strategy to Improve America's 
PlIhlic Schools (National Public Radio broadcast July 6. 20(5). 
10. I discuss the relationship between race and education infra notes 58-78. 89-90 and accompa-
nying text. On the question of education and equal opportunity more generally. see DAVID TYACK & 
LARRY CUBAN. TINKERING TOWARD UTOPIA 40-59 (1995). 
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In this article I intend to use what we have learned from fifteen 
years of experience with charter schools and explore whether the predic-
tion that they would threaten public education has proven accurate. In 
Part I, I will briefly outline why I see charter schools as a "quasi-market" 
reform, and discuss the surprisingly complicated question of what consti-
tutes a public school. In Part II, I will delineate the backdrop to the de-
bate over charter schools by situating it within the larger struggle over 
the privatization of government functions. Although government part-
nerships with private providers are not new, the nature of the debate has 
changed in the last two decades, as critics of bureaucracy have increas-
ingly pressed for market-based alternatives in various sectors. Charter 
schools came into being against this historical backdrop and reflect the 
themes of the larger movement to introduce market-based reforms and 
new governance schemes. 
In Part III, I will investigate the question of cream-skimming. I will 
first explain why there was such good reason to fear cream-skimming, by 
pointing to evidence from international choice programs and magnet 
schools in the United States. In both of those contexts, choice programs 
tended to attract more privileged students and families. I will then re-
view evidence from charter schools themselves and suggest that the re-
search to date-while it has its limitations-does not confirm the expec-
tation that charters would cream-skim. Though this could change in the 
future (and I will suggest a specific reason to fear that it might), the 
weight of the evidence so far suggests that charters and traditional public 
schools serve similar students. To the extent there are differences, char-
ter schools are more likely to serve African American students. 
I will then explore why this reform has not had the negative implica-
tions for equity that so many feared. In particular, I will emphasize that 
charter schools provide an example of how deregulation can, under cer-
tain circumstances, promote access for the less advantaged. At the same 
time, charter schools also show that some government regulation of the 
market for schools may be needed to ensure that the promise of access is 
realized. Finally, throughout Part III, I will point out that many ques-
tions relating to cream-skimming remain incompletely answered, and I 
will suggest areas for further research. 
In Part IV, I will discuss whether, even in the absence of cream-
skimming, charter schools might ultimately undermine support for fund-
ing traditional public schools. This question is at the heart of why many 
supporters of the traditional public system fear the deregulation inherent 
in the notion of charters. If the most privileged parents left for charters, 
what would happen to the political constituency for the traditional public 
schools? And wouldn't the success of charters be used as evidence by 
those who hope to reduce spending on education? Bruce Fuller asks, 
"[I]f we are to elect the proud pursuit of private interests in a revamped 
education marketplace, and to hell with the other guy, then why would a 
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no-longer-civil society tax itself to support public schools?"!! Fuller's 
question does not lend itself to the same sort of straightforward empirical 
analysis as does cream-skimming. Nonetheless, the nation's experience 
so far with charters provides some evidence bearing on the issue. 
My thesis is that, counterintuitively, deregulation via charter schools 
might have exactly the opposite effect from that which traditional public 
school supporters fear: it might create an additional constituency for the 
public school system to which charters were intended to be a market al-
ternative. My argument to this effect in Part IV will proceed in three 
steps. First, I will outline the charter sector's dependence on private phi-
lanthropy, arguing that this makes such schools economically vulnerable. 
Second, I will suggest that this vulnerability has contributed to a shift in 
rhetoric within the charter school movement, as advocates move away 
from claims that charters will cut costs and instead focus on securing ad-
ditional public funding. Third, I will argue that the structure of educa-
tion funding means that charter school efforts to obtain greater public 
support will likely depend on increasing per pupil spending in all public 
schools. 
I. WHAT ARE CHARTER SCHOOLS? WHAT ARE PUBLIC SCHOOLS? 
Before proceeding to the heart of this article, let me define some 
terms. "Charter schools" are typically created when a government con-
tracts with (or grants a charter to) an independent school operator.!2 
State law typically requires that the charter operator be a nonprofit, 
though in many states the nonprofit may in turn partner with a for-profit 
firm to manage the school.!3 Charter operators receive a specified sum of 
government money for each student who chooses to attend their school, 
and have a great deal of control over the key levers of personnel, budget, 
and curriculum. In exchange for this freedom from regulation, the 
schools must meet student achievement and other goals specified in their 
charter.!4 
Charter schools are, therefore, a move away from the bureaucratic 
model of service provided by a single monopolistic government entity. 
While charters are a more market-based approach to education, they 
nonetheless act in a highly regulated marketplace. A firm can enter the 
market only after obtaining the approval of the authorizing agency. 
II. Fuller, supra note 4, at 4. 
12. The definition of charter schools provided in this and the following paragraph is necessarily 
truncated; for a fuller description. see BRYAN C HASSEL. THE CHARTER SCHOOL CHALLENGE: 
AVOIDING THE PITFALLS. FULFILLING THE PROMISE 1-12 (1999). For a detailed and compelling ac-
count of the origins of one Bay Area charter school. see JONATHAN SCHORR. HARD LESSONS: THE 
PROMISE OF AN INNER CITY CHARTER SCHOOL (2002). 
13. Julie F. Mead. Devilish Details: Exploring Features of Charter School StatLltes that Blur the 
Public/Private Distinction. 40 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 349. 362 (2003). 
14. Charter schools are also accountable under the federal No Child Left Behind legislation. 20 
U.S.CA. § 6311(b)(2)(K) (West 2006). 
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Consumers do not themselves pay school fees, and schools cannot re-
quire families to pay more than the government allotment. Schools are 
not free to select students based on ability or other traits, but instead 
must take students by lottery if they have more applicants than spaces. 
While a school can go out of business because it loses customers, it can 
also be shut down by the government for financial irregularities or failure 
to meet student achievement goals, even if its customers are satisfied. 
For these reasons, among others, although charter schools are a move 
towards decentralization, the charter school market is so thoroughly 
regulated I suggest we consider it a "quasi-market" in educationY 
Charter schools are a form of "school choice," and for the purposes 
of this article, unless otherwise specified, when I refer to school choice I 
mean charter schools. Charters are not, however, the only form of 
school choice. Publicly funded private school choice programs, including 
school vouchers and tuition tax credits, are also part of the broad move 
toward privatization in education. Even these forms of choice-charter 
schools and private school choice-are not the only existing types. The 
majority of students in choice plans are in programs run directly by the 
traditional public school system. These include magnet schools, alterna-
tive schools, and specialty schools. In addition, some jurisdictions have 
moved away from neighborhood school assignment and offer "controlled 
choice," in which parents rank schools in a district by order of prefer-
ence.16 In a few cities, choice is allowed across district lines, typically 
permitting a specified number of students from the city system into 
higher performing suburban districtsY And of course, the most common 
choice program of all is the choice that parents with sufficient financial 
means exercise when deciding where to live. However, these other forms 
of choice do not involve the trends toward privatization or new govern-
ance arrangements that are my focus, and I do not address them in detail 
here. ls 
15. Cf Howard Glennerster, Quasi-Markets for Education?, 101 ECON. J. 1268, 1268-69 (1991) 
(discussing why Britain's move toward introducing market elements in education falls short of a com-
plete market solution). For arguments that charter schools fail to meet certain market criteria, see 
ANDREW J. COULSON, MARKET EDUCATION: THE UNKNOWN HISTORY 339 (1999), and JOHN 
MERRIFIELD, THE SCHOOL CHOICE WARS 12, 35 (2001). More recently, Lisa Snell has argued that 
although "the charter movement is far from a true education market," it is nonetheless the school 
choice reform that has "generated the most growth in the crucial for-profit education sector and sub-
stantial growth in brand-name nonprofit schools." Snell, supra note 1, at 276. 
16. See, e.g., Richard Lee Colvin, Public School Choice: An Overview, in LEAVING No CHILD 
BEHIND? OPTIONS FOR KIDS IN FAILING SCHOOLS 25 (Frederick M. Hess & Chester E. Finn, Jr. eds., 
2004). 
17. See id. at 28. 
18. For discussions of the various categories of school choice, see generally id. at 11; BROWN 
CTR. ON EDU. POLICY, BROOKINGS INST., SCHOOL CHOICE: DOING IT THE RIGHT WAY MAKES A 
DIFFERENCE, A REPORT FROM THE NATIONAL WORKING COMMISSION ON CHOICE IN K-12 
EDUCATION 14-15 (2003); and James E. Ryan & Michael Heise, The Political Economy of School 
Choice, 111 YALE L. J. 2043, 2063-85 (2002). For a discussion of choice within public school districts, 
see DEBORAH MEIER, THE POWER OF THEIR IDEAS: LESSONS FOR AMERICA FROM A SMALL SCHOOL 
IN HAVEN 91-104 (1995). 
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Finally, the introduction of the notion of school choice has high-
lighted some ambiguity regarding what it even means to be a "public 
school." 1'1 One might argue that a school is public if it is free for all stu-
dents. If so, charter schools would be public under this definition, but so 
would private schools-including religious schools-that accept govern-
ment-funded vouchers for students. Indeed, some "private" schools have 
opened in response to voucher legislation and exclusively serve students 
who pay with government funds. 20 Further complicating matters are pub-
lic universities, which we call public even though they are neither free for 
the students who attend them nor exclusively supported by public funds. 
Perhaps a school should be considered public when it is open to all 
students and does not engage in selective admission. While these fea-
tures certainly add to a school's public-ness, focusing on them as neces-
sary conditions raises some questions about the selective schools run by 
the government, which long have been considered public. To rely on a 
personal story for a moment: I spent seventh grade at New York City'S 
Hunter College High School, a selective public school. It never occurred 
to any of us that the test we took to be admitted made our school un-
public. In fact, we (even the wealthiest among us) took great delight in 
contrasting ourselves to kids from nearby private schools like Dalton and 
Collegiate (whom we labeled "soft"). Hunter was an entire school of se-
lectively admitted students, but of course the public system sorts and se-
lects students all the time within a single school, limiting some programs 
(such as gifted and talented, or Advanced Placement) to those with a cer-
tain academic profile. 
So is Hunter more "public" than a school that is free and open to all 
students regardless of academic ability, but is run by a nonprofit that has 
a charter granted by a quasi-governmental agency? If so, perhaps what 
we mean when we call a school "public" is that it is run by the school dis-
trict or government. I raise these points to suggest that our current lan-
guage of schooling does not capture the complexity of education today. 
For the sake of precision, I will use the term "district schools" or "tradi-
tional public schools" when referring to schools that are run by the 
school district, and "charter schools" when referring to that specific cate-
gory of schools. 
II. CHARTER SCHOOLS IN THE CONTEXT OF THE LARGER 
PRIVATIZATION DEBATE 
Americans both support and fear government, bureaucracy, and 
regulation. Accordingly, the proper role of government in society re-
19. For a thoughtful discussion of some of the issues raised here. see Frederick Hess. Making 
Semeojthe "Pliblic" in Pliblic Edllcation. PROGRESSIVE POL'y INST. POL'y REP .. Nov. 2002. at I. 
20. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris. 530 U.S. 639. 656-57 n.4 (2002) (discussing Cleveland private 
schools created in response to voucher plan). 
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mains one of our nation's great ongoing debates. Since at least the 1980s, 
the dominant trend in both government and the academy has been to cri-
tique the activist state.21 "Government is not the solution to the problem; 
government is the problem," announced Ronald Reagan in his first inau-
gural address.22 Intimately connected to this challenge to government's 
capacity are claims about the superiority of markets for regulating hu-
man affairs. The Republican House Majority Leader at the time, Dick 
Armey, stated the claim in its most extreme form when he proclaimed, 
"[t]he market is rational and the government is dumb."23 These political 
arguments find substantial support in the academy, where public choice 
theorists and others have critiqued the New Deal administrative state for 
being inefficient, inequitable, and unwieldy.24 
The political and academic attacks on the activist state have sup-
ported policy shifts toward increased privatization over the past thirty 
years. The term "privatization" -defined broadly as "the shifting of a 
function, either in whole or in part, from the public sector to the private 
sector" -has multiple meanings.25 It can involve selling government as-
sets, such as when the government sold the bulk of its interest in Conrail, 
a freight rail service.26 Privatization also includes government reliance on 
private entities to establish regulatory standards.27 Additionally, it can 
involve user fees, where the government charges individual citizens for 
services or facilities-such as using a highway-that might otherwise be 
supported by general tax revenue. Another type of privatization occurs 
when government contracts with private for- and non-profits to provide 
services that the government previously provided itself. This is an ex-
tremely broad category; it includes outsourcing tasks as diverse as run-
21. As Steve Croley points out, "Not since the 1960s have either Republicans or Democrats run 
on a platform that defends big government, much less calls for increased reliance on regulatory gov-
ernment as a solution to social problems." STEVEN P. CROLEY, REGULATION AND PUBLIC 
INTERESTS: ON THE POSSIBILITIES OF GOOD REGULATORY GOVERNMENT (forthcoming 2007) 
(manuscript at 1, on file with author). 
22. President Ronald Reagan, First Inaugural Address (Jan. 20, 1981), reprinted in THE INSIDER, 
Winter 2006, at 25, available at http://www.insideronline.org/archives/2006/winter/winter.pdf. 
23. DICK ARMEY, THE FREEDOM REVOLUTION: THE NEW REpUBLICAN HOUSE MAJORITY 
LEADER TELLS WHY BIG GOVERNMENT FAILED, WHY FREEDOM WORKS, AND How WE WILL 
REBUILD AMERICA 316 (1995). 
24. For a discussion of public choice and related theories, see HARVEY FEIGENBAUM ET AL., 
SHRINKING THE STATE: THE POLITICAL UNDERPINNINGS OF PRIVATIZATION 20-26 (1999), and lody 
Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 567-71 (2000). 
25. Stuart Butler, Privatization for Public Purposes, in PRIVATIZATION AND ITS ALTERNATIVES 
17, 17 (William T. Gormley, lr. ed., 1991). For a discussion of some of the varied approaches to priva-
tization by one of its most enthusiastic supporters, see E. S. Savas, Privatization and the New Public 
Management, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.l. 1731 (2001). For more dispassionate perspectives, see 
FEIGENBAUM ET AL., supra note 24, at 5-11, and Lester M. Salamon, The New Governance and The 
Tools of Public Action: An Introduction, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1611 (2001). 
26. FEIGENBAUM ET AL., supra note 24, at 115. The sale of state assets is more typically a fea-
ture of privatization internationally than here, as the U.S. government did not hold as many assets in 
the modern era as did many governments, and therefore had less to sell. 
27. Freeman, supra note 24, at 553-54 (discussing negotiated rule making and self-regulation of 
industries). 
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ning prisons, providing sanitation or snow removal services, managing 
welfare reform, and rebuilding war zones.2X 
Closely related to these forms of privatization has been the emer-
gence of a variety of new regulatory and governance regimes, many of 
which advertise themselves as capturing the potential of market-based 
reforms and deregulation while retaining what is useful about bureauc-
racy. Environmental regulation, for example, increasingly relies on mar-
ket-based mechanisms in place of more prescriptive regulation.2~ Fur-
ther, under some of these new approaches to governance, collaboration 
between the government, private firms, and citizens is meant to replace 
the hierarchy and control of the New Deal era.30 In addition, govern-
ment agencies are supposed to run themselves more like private firms.31 
In describing the trend toward privatization and market-based 
mechanisms, some caveats deserve special emphasis. First, framing the 
debate as a stark dichotomy between prescriptive and market-based 
regulation overlooks the extent to which markets rely on government 
and vice versa.32 Second, the attack on the administrative state does not 
necessarily amount to an attack on the welfare state; one can endorse the 
purposes of the welfare state without supporting the means typically as-
sociated with the administrative state.33 Of course, the two critiques are 
often associated, for both "are informed by a skepticism about the ability 
2K Jack M. Beerman. Privatization and Political Accountability. 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1507. 
1519 (2001). The final category-using private contractors to do work previously done by the armed 
forces-has attracted substantial attention during the occupation of Iraq. For a compelling account of 
the death of four Americans killed in Fallujah while working for private contractor Blackwater Secu-
rity. see Sean Flynn. The Day the War Turned. GO. Feb. 6. 2006. at 104. 
29. See. e.g .. Jody Freeman & Daniel A. Farber. Modular Environmental Regulation. 54 DUKE 
L.J. 795.814-21 (2005). The most familiar example in the environment sector is the acid rain program 
in the Clean Air Act. where emissions trading schemes allow firms to trade their pollution allocations 
with one another. Id. at 814. 
30. Orly Lobel has catalogued the range of scholarly theories that have given rise to the new 
governance field. including ""'reflexive law.' 'soft law.' 'collaborative governance.' 'democratic experi-
mentalism.' 'responsive regulation.' 'outsourcing regulation.' 'reconstitutive law.' 'post-regulatory law.' 
'revitalizing regulation.' 'regulatory pluralism.' 'decentering regulation.' ·meta-regulation.' 'contrac-
tarian law.' 'communicative governance.' 'negotiated governance.' 'cooperative implementation.' and 
'interactive compliance ... · Orly Lobel. The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Gov-
ernance in Contemporary Legal Thought. 89 MINN. L. REV. 342, 345-47 (2004). 
31. Martha Minow. Public and Private Partnerships: Accounting for the New Religion. 116 
HARV. L. REV. 1229.1245 (2003): MINOW. supra note 5. at 6-49. See generally DAVID OSBORNE & 
TED GAEBLER. REINVENTING GOVERNMENT: How THE ENTREPRENEURIAL SPIRIT IS 
TRANSFORMING THE PUBLIC SECTOR (1992). 
32. Freeman & Farber, supra note 29. at 819-20. Indeed, the very analytic value of distinguish-
ing between public and private has been challenged since the advent of legal realism. Gary Peller. 
Public Imperialism and Private Resistance: Progressive Possibilities of the New Private Law. 73 DENV. 
U. L. REV. 1001. 1003--D5 (1996); see also FEIGENBAUM ET AL.. supra note 24. at 8-11. 
33. Matthew Diller. Redefining the Public Sector: Accountability and Democracy in the Era of 
Privatization. 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1307. 1307-08 (2001). Moreover. some of the most thoughtful 
advocates for reforming the regulatory state identify themselves as political progressives. For exam-
ple. Susan Rose-Ackerman argues that her "goal is not to dismantle the state but reform it." and sug-
gests that "[p]rogressive reform of government programs challenges the simplistic economic analysis 
used by right-wing critics of the regulatory-welfare state." SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN. RETHINKING 
THE PROGRESSIVE AGENDA: THE REFORM OFTHE AMERICAN REGULATORY STATE 190 (1992). 
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of government to solve problems and a suspicion of government deci-
sion-makers."34 
Third, in focusing on the recent trend toward privatization, I must 
emphasize that these developments are not always as novel as their pro-
ponents or detractors sometimes suggest. San Francisco first contracted 
with private companies to collect its garbage in 1932.35 Without attract-
ing much notice or controversy, private firms deliver most government-
financed job training, mental health, and drug abuse programs in some 
cities.36 In an earlier era, it was political liberals who were skeptical of 
bureaucracy and sought to have services provided by nongovernmental 
agencies.3? The leading War on Poverty programs, for example, relied 
heavily on both partnerships between the federal government, which 
provided funds, and community-based non profits, which planned and de-
livered services.38 As a result, nonprofits today run 80% of America's so-
cial service agencies, 70% of its vocational rehabilitation facilities, 50% 
of its hospitals, almost 50% of its colleges and universities, 30% of its 
daycare centers, and 25% of its nursing homes.39 This blurring of the 
lines between public and private also explains how today's body of fed-
eral employees is one-third smaller on a per capita basis than it was im-
mediately after the New Deal, even though government has taken on ad-
ditional functions.40 
Despite these historical antecedents, the moves toward privatization 
over the past thirty years have had, at least in part, a different tone. If 
the partnerships of the War on Poverty era were crafted out of optimism 
about what government could achieve, school choice arose in an era 
when many powerful constituencies argued that government should get 
out of the way.4i The Reagan administration laid the groundwork for 
privatization with critiques of the activist state that included the proposal 
34. Diller, supra note 33, at 1307. 
3S. FEIGENBAUM ET AL., supra note 24, at 123. 
36. David R. Riemer, Government as Administrator vs. Government as Purchaser: Do Rules or 
Markets Create Greater Accountability in Serving the Poor?, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J.l71S, 1726 (2001). 
37. Matthew Diller, Form and Substance in the Privatization of Poverty Programs, 49 UCLA L. 
REv. 1739, 1748 (2002); James Fonnan, Jr., The Secret History of School Choice: How Progressives 
Got There First, 93 GEO. L.J. 1287, 1301-OS (200S). 
38. Lester M. Salamon, The Resilient Sector, in THE STATE OF NONPROFIT AMERICA S (Lester 
M. Salamon ed., 2002); see also DONALD F. KETTL, SHARiNG POWER: PUBLIC GOVERNANCE AND 
PRIVATE MARKETS 4 (1993) ("[E]very major policy initiative launched by the federal government 
since World War II-including Medicare and Medicaid, environmental cleanup and restoration, anti· 
poverty programs and job training, interstate highways and sewage treatment plants-has been man· 
aged through public-private partnerships."). 
39. Salamon, supra note 38, at 9-10. 
40. Lobel, supra note 30, at 374. 
41. JEFFREY R. HENIG, RETHINKING SCHOOL CHOICE: LiMITS OF THE MARKET METAPHOR S 
(1994) ("Not only in the United States, but in much of the world, dissatisfaction with the growing ap-
paratus of government has sparked a privatization movement. Its goals are to shrink the public sector 
by selling government-owned assets and contracting with private firms to provide public services, and 
to replace large social-welfare 'helping' agencies with simpler voucher-type programs that encourage 
recipients to help themselves. "). 
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to abolish the Department of Education.42 By the 1990s, when charter 
schools were first considered, the Republican Party's critique of nonde-
fense government spending was matched by Democrats, with President 
Bill Clinton proclaiming that "the era of big government is over.,,43 Clin-
ton was influenced by David Osborne and Ted Gaebler, whose book, Re-
inventing Government: How the Entrepreneurial Spirit is Transforming 
the Public Sector, emphasized how public officials could learn important 
lessons from the private sector, including leveraging the market.44 
Shortly after taking office, Clinton appointed Vice President Al Gore to 
oversee a National Performance Review whose goal was to set the 
framework for the "shift from top-down bureaucracy to entrepreneurial 
government.,,45 Gore's subsequent report contained a damning critique 
of government failure, with conclusions such as "Washington's failures 
are large and obvious," "it is almost as if federal programs were designed 
not to work," and "we have spent too much money for programs that 
don't work.,,46 
Public confidence in most American institutions was declining dur-
ing the 1990s, and some data suggested that faith in government was faI-
ling faster than confidence in the nonprofit and private sectors.47 The 
rhetoric for privatization became increasingly heated. For example, 
Grover Norquist, president of Americans for Tax Reform and an influ-
ential conservative leader, told National Public Radio's Morning Edition 
in 2001, "I don't want to abolish government. I simply want to reduce it 
42. Bruce Fuller. The Public Square. Big or Small?, Charter Schools in Political Contest. in 
INSIDE CHARTER SCHOOLS: THE PARADOX OF RADICAL DECENTRALIZATION 12.54 (Bruce Fuller 
ed .. 2000). Although the Department of Education proposal did not go far. other Reagan administra-
tion initiatives had a more lasting impact. In 1983. the Office of Management and Budget directed 
federal agencies to open more of their activities to private businesses in the competitive marketplace. 
Kirsten A. Gronbjerg & Lester M. Salamon. Devolution. Marketization, and the Changing Shape of 
Government-Nonprofit Relations. in THE STATE OF NONPROFIT AMERICA. supra note 38. at 454. 
Reagan also established a Commission on Privatization. which suggested increasing private sector in-
volvement in a number of areas. including low-income housing. schools. prisons. and the postal ser-
vice. DAVID F. LlNOWES. PRIVATIZATION: TOWARD MORE EFFECTIVE GOVERNMENT. REPORT OF 
THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON PRIVATIZATION (1988). For a discussion of the gap between the 
rhetoric and reality of the Reagan administration's attacks on the regulatory-welfare state. see ROSE-
ACKERMAN, supra note 33. at 149-83. 
43. Clinton used the language of the market to endorse charter schools. arguing that "[c)harter 
schools are living proof of what parents and teachers can do to reinvigorate public education. They 
keep their charters only so long as their customers are satisfied they're doing a good job." Fuller. Sl/-
pra note 42. at 25. 
44. See generally OSBORNE & GAEBLER. supra note 31. For a discussion of the book's influence 
on Clinton. see FEIGENBAUM ET AL .. supra note 24. at 143. 
45. BILL CLINTON & AL GORE. PUTTING PEOPLE FIRST: How WE CAN ALL CHANGE AMERICA 
24 (1992). 
46. AL GORE. CREATING A GOVERNMENT THAT WORKS BE'ITER & COSTS LESS: REPORT OF 
THE NATIONAL PERFORMANCE REVIEW 1-2 (1993). 
47. See Leslie Lenkowsky. Foundations and Corporate Philanthropy. in THE STATE OF 
NONPROFIT AMERICA. supra note 38, at 372. 
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to the size where I can drag it into the bathroom and drown it in the 
bathtub. "48 
What did these trends mean for schools? As with the larger privati-
zation debates, the argument for greater market involvement in schools 
has historical antecedents. Private contractors have long provided ser-
vices to schools, including testing materials, textbooks, transportation, 
and food. School systems routinely contract with private vendors to pro-
vide teaching and other core education-related services to particular 
groups of students, such as special education students or those with be-
havioral issues.49 Nor were governance debates entirely new. Educa-
tional historian David Tyack points out that "when Americans grow dis-
satisfied with public schools, they tend to blame the way they are 
governed. ,,50 
Yet, the school governance debates ignited by choice proposals 
were different. Previous efforts to decentralize control had presumed 
that key decisions would be made by a public entity.51 Indeed, schools 
typify the model of direct governmental service - the government alone 
decides how much schooling to offer, finances it, and delivers it with its 
own employees. Moreover, bureaucratization in schools has meant that 
central administrators at all levels of government have tried to control 
what takes place in the classroom through hierarchy and rule.52 
But increasing numbers of critics argued that existing public institu-
tions were incapable of making the changes needed to create effective 
learning environments. One of the principal arguments for choice was 
that failing government-run schools could not reform themselves. In 
1990, political scientists John Chubb and Terry Moe wrote Politics, Mar-
kets and America's Schools, a hugely influential book arguing that de-
mocratic control of schools caused district schools to fail and only mar-
kets could provide a solution.53 "Existing institutions cannot solve the 
problem" of low-performing students, they wrote, "because they are the 
48. Mara Liasson. Conservative Advocate, Morning Edition (National Public Radio broadcast 
May 25, 2001), available at http://www.npr.orgltemplates/story/story.php?storyId=1123439. 
49. GUILBERT C. HENTSCHKE ET AL., TRENDS AND BEST PRACfICES FOR EDUCATION 
MANAGEMENT ORGANIZATIONS 3 (West ed. 2003). 
50. David Tyack, School Governance in the United States: Historical Puzzles and Anomalies, in 
DECENTRALIZATION AND SCHOOL IMPROVEMENT 1, 1 (Jane Hannaway & Martin Carnoy eds., 1993). 
Tyack also points out that changes in governance do not typically influence how students are taught in 
the classroom, with basic patterns of instruction remaining largely unchanged. Id.; see also LARRY 
CUBAN, How TEACHERS TAUGHT: CONSTANCY AND CHANGE IN AMERICAN CLASSROOMS, 1890-
1980 (1984). Richard Elmore makes a similar point, arguing that debates about centralization concern 
who has the power to make decisions about what happens in schools, but do not address the actual 
process of teaching and learning or how to improve it. Richard F. Elmore, School Decentralization: 
Who Gains? Who Loses?, in DECENTRALIZATION AND SCHOOL IMPROVEMENT, supra, at 33, 40. 
51. James S. Liebman & Charles F. Sabel, A Public Laboratory Dewey Barely Imagined: The 
Emerging Model of School Governance and Legal Reform, 28 N.Y.V. REV. L. & SOc. CHANGE 183, 
184 (2003). 
52. Id. 
53. JOHN E. CHUBB & TERRY M. MOE, POLITICS, MARKETS AND AMERICA'S SCHOOLS 65, 141, 
180-81 (1990). 
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problem .... "54 Instead of attempting to change public sector institu-
tions, the new reformers argued that schools needed to be deregulated 
and to operate more like businesses. Schools were to fight for "market 
share," and create "brand loyalty" among their "customers.,,55 
These market metaphors seemed foreign, even threatening, to edu-
cators. Many responded that markets do not serve everybody equally 
well. They remarked that markets have winners and losers, and that the 
poor and minorities usually lose. As one privatization opponent argued, 
for America's poorest children, "it is the market that has destroyed their 
neighborhoods and the livelihoods of the adults they rely on. Unleashing 
the market on the public schools will only compound the harm."56 An-
other worried that "charter school reform may lead to a form of competi-
tion between schools that will allow those with the most valued cultural 
capital to commodify it in the educational marketplace, leaving those 
whose cultural capital is less valued with far less market power.,,57 
III. Do CHARTERS CREAM-SKIM ADVANTAGED STUDENTS AND 
FAMILIES? 
A. The Fear of Cream-Skimming 
Supporters of traditional public schools have long feared that by 
providing additional exit options, charter schools allow the most advan-
taged parents and children to flee the public system.5X Charter schools 
"tend to attract parents who live and work in relatively privileged com-
munities," worried Michael Apple.59 Geoff Whitty argued that charter 
schools in the United States "are being colonized by the already advan-
54. [d. at 3. 
55. For examples of school choice advocates using market metaphors, see Paul Hill. The Educa-
tional Consequences of Choice. 77 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 671 (1996). and Bruno Manno et al.. How 
Charter Schools are Different, 79 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 489 (1998). For a discussion of efforts to import 
business practices into schools, see generally LARRY CUBAN, THE BLACKBOARD AND THE BOTTOM 
LINE: WHY SCHOOLS CAN'T BE BUSINESSES (2004). 
56. Alex Molnar, Charter Schools: The Smiling Face of Disinvestment. EDUC. LEADERSHIP, Oct. 
1996. at 9.15. 
57. Amy Stuart Wells et al.. Charter Schools as Postmodern Paradox: Rethinking Social Stratifi-
cation in an Age of Deregulated School Choice. 69 HARV. EDUC. REV. 172. 181 (1999). A related cri-
tique is advanced by Jonathan Kozol, who argues that the market metaphor in education encourages 
schools to focus exclusively on training children for the workplace. JONATHAN KOZOL, THE SHAME 
OFTHE NATION: THE RESTORATION OF APARTHEID SCHOOLING IN AMERICA 89-108 (2005). 
58. I do not suggest that this is the only criticism levied against charter schools. For example. 
there is a fierce fight among educational researchers regarding whether charter schools promote in-
creased student achievement for those students who attend them. Compare F. HOWARD NELSON ET 
AL.. CHARTER SCHOOL ACHIEVEMENT ON THE 2003 NATIONAL ASSESSMENT OF EDUCATIONAL 
PROGRESS (2003) (students in charters do worse). with CAROLINE M. HOXBY, ACHIEVEMENT IN 
CHARTER SCHOOLS AND REGULAR PUBLIC SCHOOLS IN THE UNITED STATES (2004) (students in 
charters do better). My interest here. however. is with a different question-the threat posed by char-
ters to the traditional public system. 
59. Michael W. Apple. Are Markets and Standards Democratic? 27 EDUC. RESEARCHER 24. 26 
(1998) (book review). 
HeinOnline -- 2007 U. Ill. L. Rev. 852 2007
852 UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2007 
taged."60 Bruce Fuller said that charter schools are a response to parents' 
yearning for the days when politics happened in town meetings and edu-
cation in tiny school houses. "A return to the one-room schoolhouse is 
an attractive ideal, for it keeps our communal customs, moral beliefs, 
language, and forms of literacy within the four walls of that little school-
house just down the street," said Fuller.61 "But all tribes are not created 
equal: some elders hold more wealth than others; the parents in some 
tribes hold better jobs and are better educated than those in other 
tribes. ,,62 
These fears were most frequently expressed during the earliest 
years of the debate over charter schools, but they persist today. Accord-
ing to a 2005 task force that interviewed charter and district school repre-
sentatives in the Bay Area, "Many people on all sides of the issue con-
tinue to be locked into what appear to be frozen positions."63 School 
district leaders and teachers still believe that "charters are skimming off 
the best students in public education," and imagine "total destruction of 
public education as the motivation driving supporters of charter 
schools."64 Amy Stambach and Natalie Crow Becker argue that local of-
ficials and affluent white parents can work together to create segregated 
charter schools that "reinforce traditional lines of exclusion and stratifi-
cation. ,,65 
If charter schools cream-skim more privileged students, the tradi-
tional public system is doubly damaged. First, district schools are left 
with the most expensive children to educate. Second, the system loses a 
critical asset-those parents whose race and class status make them best 
able to advocate for schools.66 As the authors of a prominent early study 
60. GEOFF WHITfY ET AL., DEVOLUTION AND CHOICE IN EDUCATION 98 (1998). 
61. Fuller, supra note 42, at 28. 
62. Id. 
63. ERIC ROFES, DISTRICT SCHOOLS, CHARTER SCHOOLS: FINDING COMMON GROUND, A 
REpORT FROM THE ALAMEDA COUNTY OFFICE OF EDUCA nON 7 (2005). 
64. Id. at 6, 7. More recently, some charter school supporters have flipped the original cream-
skimming argument on its head, claiming that charter schools actually serve a disproportionately dis-
advantaged student population. See, e.g., William G. Howell & Martin R. West, Gray Lady Wheezing: 
The AFT Hoodwinks the Times, 2005 EDUC. NEXT 74, 76; Jay Mathews, Are Charter Schools Any 
Good?, WASH. POST, Oct. 28, 2004, http://www.washingtonpost.comfwp-dynlarticles/A18571-
2004Nov2.html (quoting Martin West's claim that "black students who attend charter schools may well 
come from poorer families than black students in traditional public schools"). 
65. Amy Stambach & Natalie Crow Becker, Finding the Old in the New: On Race and Class in 
U.S. Charter School Debates, 9 RACE ETHNICITY & EDUC. 159, 160 (2006). 
66. In focusing on the claim that cream-skimming could lead to less political support for tradi-
tional public schools, I do not mean to suggest that this is the only reason one might appropriately fear 
cream-skimming. Many have debated the value that integrated educational environments play in 
promoting academic achievement and exposing young people to a world beyond their own, and I do 
not join that discussion here. For arguments emphasizing the benefits of integrated education, see 
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330-33 (2003); AMY STUART WELLS & ROBERT L. CRAIN, 
STEPPING OVER THE COLOR LINE: AFRICAN-AMERICAN STUDENTS IN WHITE SUBURBAN SCHOOLS 
180-218 (1997); and Ryan & Heise, supra note 18, at 2102--08. For suggestions that integration may be 
overrated, see Justice Thomas's concurring opinion in Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 114-38 (1995), 
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on charters put it: if wealthy parents end up with greater access to charter 
schools, "[t]heir success in this could lead to less political support for 
public funding of education as a whole. "h7 The potential for cream-
skimming in a more deregulated educational marketplace comes from 
both schools and families. Schools subject to market conditions might 
seek to recruit students whose background characteristics make them the 
most likely to achieve high test scores at relatively low cost to the school. 
For their part, privileged parents might be more active buyers, better 
able to manage the marketplace.ox 
The idea that schools benefit from the presence of wealthy and 
white families has an impressive pedigree in America. The engineers of 
the school desegregation effort argued that they fought for Brown v. 
Board of Education in part because they believed that "green follows 
white."o9 Black children, they believed, need to sit next to white children 
in schools not because white children have magical properties, but be-
cause they have white parents. Given our nation's history of racial dis-
crimination, white parents were more likely to have the political and eco-
nomic clout necessary to secure well-funded, high-quality schools. 
The "green follows white" intuition has survived/II even as Brown's 
prominence has waned.71 This intuition was the basis for the magnet 
school movement that sought voluntary desegregation, and has since 
been advanced through the writings of Jonathan Kozol and Gary Or-
field.72 Still others, like Richard Kahlenberg, have abandoned the no-
tion's racial overtones but kept the core of the idea by arguing for eco-
nomic integration of schools. Kahlenberg suggests that middle-class 
parents and children bring assets to which poor children need access.73 
and Robin D. Barnes. Black America and School Choice: Char/ing 1I New Course. 106 YALE L.J. 2375. 
2381-98 (1997). 
67. UCLA STUDY. supra note 3. 
68. As Bruce Fuller argues. "To shop around for choice schools in Boston or Milwaukee or San 
Antonio. you have to be out there for a few days to sign up for schools and to get into the lottery." 
Bruce Fuller. Remarks at Forum Co-sponsored by the Harvard Graduate School of Education and 
Pioneer Institute: Charter Schools: Raiders or Reformers? (Oct. 23. 1996). available at http://www. 
pioneerinstitute.org/research/dialogues/pidlgI7.cfm: see also LARRY KUEHN. BRITISH COLUMBIA 
TEACHERS' FED·N. TEN PROBLEMS WITH CHARTER SCHOOLS (1995). available at http://bctf.ca/ 
publications/ResearchReports.aspx?id=561O ("Charter schools create two-tiered education" in part 
because "parents with the most resources [take] advantage of the situation for their children."). 
69. Jack Balkin. What Brown Teaches Us Abolll Constillltional Theory. 90 VA. L. REV. 1537. 
1570--71 (2004). 
70. Lia Epperson. Resi.<lillg Rerrear: The Srmggle for Equity in Educarional Opporruniry in rhe 
Posr·Brown Era. 66 U. PITT. L. REV. 131. 145 (2004) (arguing from the perspective of a school deseg-
regation lawyer that the "green follows white" adage remains relevant). 
71. Molly S. McUsic. The Future of Brown v. Board of Education: Economic Inregrarion of rhe 
Public Schools. 117 HARV. L. REV. 1334.1334 (2004) (''IT]he influence of Brown is thirty years past its 
peak .... "). 
72. For recent contributions from these prolific authors. see KOZOL. supra note 57: GARY 
ORFIELD & CHUNGMEI LEI. BROIVN AT 50: KING'S DREAM OR PLLSSY'S NIGHTMARE? (2004). avai/-
able ar http://www.civilrightsproject.harvard.edu/researchlreseg04/brown50.pdf. 
73. RICHARD D. KAHLENBERG. ALL TOGETHER Now: CREATING MIDDLE CLASS SCHOOLS 
THROUGH PUBLIC SCHOOL CHOICE 47-58. 61-67 (2001). 
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The idea resonates outside of education as well, serving as the justifica-
tion for housing policy that seeks to promote race and class integration.74 
The fear that charter schools would encourage white and middle-
class parents to leave district schools is especially worrisome for those 
who remember the way southern states used choice to evade Brown. 
Some adopted "freedom of choice" plans, which purported to give op-
tions to black and white families, but in fact were an attempt to keep 
black and white students in the same segregated schools they attended 
before Brown.75 Others gave tuition grants that allowed white students 
to attend private, segregated academies.76 Though these plans were 
eventually struck down, they effectively delayed Brown's implementa-
tion by at least a decade.77 
As for the North, a different kind of freedom of choice led to white 
flight from central-city school districts. There, many whites moved to the 
suburbs, a choice which became yet more attractive after the Supreme 
Court effectively eliminated mandatory interdistrict busing in Milliken v. 
Bradley.78 
Against this historical backdrop, supporters of a robust, equity-
oriented public education system were on high alert for any evidence 
that charters would cream-skim privileged students. When charter 
school laws were initially proposed, researchers turned to analogous con-
texts and made predictions about the likely impact of charters. Findings 
from two areas suggested that cream-skimming was likely. The first was 
evidence from school choice experiments overseas. In England, for ex-
ample, choice programs led schools to market themselves to gifted stu-
74. Perhaps the most well-known housing integration programs of this sort are the Gautreaux 
program and the subsequent federal Moving to Opportunity program. both of which sought to provide 
inner-city blacks access to housing in suburban neighborhoods. For a discussion of these programs 
and other attempts to promote residential diversity. see PETER H. SHUCK, DIVERSITY IN AMERICA: 
KEEPING GOVERNMENT AT A SAFE DISTANCE 227-31 (2003). See also SHERYLL CASHIN, THE 
FAILURES OF INTEGRATION: How RACE AND CLASS ARE UNDERMINING THE AMERICAN DREAM 
222-28.258-60 (2004) (discussing the Gautreaux program as a mechanism to increase school integra-
tion by increasing housing integration). 
75. See, e.g., Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 431-55 (1967). 
76. See, e.g., Griffin v. State Bd. of Educ., 296 F. Supp. 1178,1180-81 (E.D. Va. 1969); see also 
Jerome C. Hafter & Peter M. Hoffman, Note, Segregation Academies and State Action, 82 YALE LJ. 
1436,1440 (1973) (discussing tuition grant legislation in southern states). These plans were not racially 
discriminatory on their face. For example, Virginia's plan made tuition grants available to "[e]very 
child in [the] Commonwealth ... who desires to attend a nonsectarian private school." Griffin, 296 F. 
Supp. at 1180. They had the effect of furthering segregation, however, because voucher recipients 
could use vouchers in all-white private schools that had the freedom to discriminate in admissions. Id. 
at 1181. 
77. See Wendy Parker, The Color of Choice: Race and Charter Schools, 75 TuL. L. REV. 563, 568 
(2001) (arguing that "choice has a history of unlawfully segregating students"); see also Molly Townes 
O'Brien, Private School Tuition Vouchers and the Realities of Racial Politics, 64 TENN. L. REV. 359, 
398 (1997) (discussing history of private school tuition voucher programs, and arguing that it is "a 
movement propelled by racism and fueled by propaganda"). 
78. 418 U.S. 717, 745-47 (1974); see Goodwin Liu & William L. Taylor, School Choice to Achieve 
Desegregation, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 791, 792 (2005) ("With [Milliken], enclaves of affluent white 
families in suburban school districts obtained near immunity from the reach of school desegregation, 
even when such remedies were logistically feasible and necessary to correct a racial wrong. "). 
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dents.79 Disadvantaged students, including those with special needs, cost 
more to educate and schools fear getting a reputation for serving such 
students well. To do so might scare off the parents of more desirable 
children. so 
As a result, English schools have ended up recruiting students with 
one or more of the following characteristics: South Asian, middle class, 
highly motivated, and academically advanced.sl Interestingly, in light of 
the historical pattern of sex discrimination in education, research from 
England also suggests that schools seek female students, who tend to 
score higher and pose fewer behavioral challenges.x2 Finally, in line with 
the conclusion that schools have sought more advantaged children, evi-
dence from England also indicates that parents with means are better 
able to take advantage of choice offerings.s3 
Those who feared that charters would cream-skim did not have to 
rely solely on evidence from choice overseas. Findings from choice in 
U.S. schools also raised concerns about creaming effects. In the initial 
debates over whether to enact charter legislation, research from the 
magnet school experience was frequently cited as suggesting that the 
most advantaged parents would exercise choice. In the 1970s and 1980s, 
many public school systems developed magnet schools and other schools 
of choice, frequently as a way of encouraging voluntary desegregation. 
The idea was simple: in addition to neighborhood schools, families would 
be able to choose from among a menu of magnets, which would attempt 
to draw families by offering specialized courses in fields such as technol-
ogy, math and science, or the arts. "If you think shopping for sneakers is 
a kick, try shopping for a high school," advertised a flyer for choice 
79. For discussions of choice leading to cream-skimming in England. see Michael W. Apple. 
Comparing Neo-liberal Projects and Ineqllality in Edllcation. 37 COMPo EDUC. 409. 417 (2001): Will 
Bartlett. QlIasi-Markets and Edllcational Reforms. in QUASI-MARKETS AND SOCIAL POLICY 125. 125-
53 (Julian Le Grand & Will Barlett eds .. 1993): Carol Vincent et al.. Policy and Practice: The Changing 
Nalllre of Special Edllcational Provision in Schools. 22 BRIT. J. SPECIAL EDUC. 4.5-6.9 (1995): Geof-
frey Walford. Diversity and Choice in School Edllcation: An Alternative View. 22 OXFORD REV. EDUC. 
143. 147-50 (1996): Geoff Whitty. Creating Quasi-Markets in Education: A Review of Recent Research 
on Parental Choice and School Autonomy in Three Countries. 22 REV. RES. EDUC. 3. 7-8 (1997). 
80. SHARON GEWIRTZ ET AL.. MARKETS. CHOICE AND EQUITY IN EDUCATION 141-42 (1995): 
see also RICHARD BOWE ET AL.. REFORMING EDUCATION AND CHANGING SCHOOLS 137 (1992) (dis-
cussing "longer-term costs involved in giving too high a profile" to special education students. includ-
ing "market image" and "national testing performance"). 
81. RICHARD BOWE ET AL.. sllpra note 80. at 138-41. 
82. Id. at 140. Whether the U.S. experience with choice will result in privileging girls in the edu-
cational marketplace remains an open question. 
83. Stephen J. Ball et al.. Market Forces and Parental Choice: Self-Interest and Competitive Ad-
vantage in Edllcation. in EDUCATIONAL REFORM AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 13. 19 (Sally Tomlinson 
ed .. 1994) (noting that middle class parents are "more likely to have the knowledge. skills and contacts 
to decode and manipulate what are increasingly complex and deregulated systems of choice and re-
cruitment"). The same results hold for New Zealand and Scotland. where wealthier families are more 
likely to exercise choice. leaving working-class and poor children in increasingly disadvantaged 
schools. For evidence from New Zealand. see EDWARD B. FISKE & HELEN F. LADD. WHEN SCHOOLS 
COMPETE: A CAUTIONARY TALE (2000): WHITTY ET AL.. sllpra note 60. at 3. 120-21: and Apple. Sll-
pra note 79. at 418. For research on Scotland. see Walford. slIpra note 79. at 148. 
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within the Boston public school system. "And if you're in the eighth 
grade, you can do just that: shop around and 'buy' the best high school 
for yoU."84 
Magnet schools are typically allowed to choose from among student 
applicants. As a result, they often choose students with better academic 
records or more aggressive parents.85 In their study of New York, Chi-
cago, Philadelphia, and Boston, Donald Moore and Suzanne Davenport 
found that "low-income students, black students, Hispanic students, spe-
cial education students, bilingual students, and students with attendance 
problems were systematically underrepresented in academically selective 
schools, but heavily concentrated in low-income and low- to moderate-
income nonselective schools. ,,86 The result for the neighborhood schools 
was dire; they "often lost those active and well-connected parents who 
could have worked to improve and aid their children's neighborhood 
high school.,,87 Other reviews of magnet schools reached the same con-
clusions about cream-skimming.88 Given the evidence from choice ex-
periments overseas and from magnet schools in the United States, it was 
reasonable to predict that charters would also cream-skim. 
B. The Evidence from Charter Schools 
A decade later, however, we no longer have to speculate, based on 
these other choice experiments, about the likelihood of charters cream-
skimming. We now have evidence from charter schools themselves. As I 
will explore, although many questions remain unanswered, what we have 
learned to date does not confirm fears of charter cream-skimming. I will 
discuss what we do (and do not) know in the following areas: race, class, 
parent and student motivation, parental education levels, and student 
achievement. These categories are salient for at least two reasons. First, 
they predict, to various degrees, student educational outcomes. For ex-
ample, we know that, on average, wealthy students outperform poorer 
ones, and students with better educated parents do better than those with 
less educated ones. Second, those who fear cream-skimming have long 
suggested that these areas are the dimensions in which it was likely to oc-
cur. 
84. The publication, An Exercise in Decision Making: Choosing a High School, is quoted in 
HENIG, supra note 41, at 13. 
85. Donald R. Moore & Suzanne Davenport, School Choice: The New Improved Sorting Ma-
chine, in CHOICE IN EDUCATION: POTENTIAL AND PROBLEMS 187, 199-202 (William Lowe Boyd & 
Herbert J. Walberg eds., 1990). 
86. [d. at 192. 
87. [d. at 204. 
88. Valerie Martinez et aI., Public School Choice in San Antonio: Who Chooses and with What 
Effects?, in WHO CHOOSES? WHO LOSES? CULTURE, INSTITUTIONS AND THE UNEQUAL EFFECTS OF 
SCHOOL CHOICE 50, 57...{i0 (Bruce Fuller et al. eds., 1996). 
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1. Race 
Race and education have long been inextricably linked. Southern 
state constitutions protect the right to a free public education because of 
the work of Reconstruction Republicans and black southern political 
conventions.89 Brown, of course, solidified the connection between race 
and education in the minds of many Americans. Today, the Holy Grail 
for educational reform is reducing the gap in test scores between black 
and white students.9o Results from the 2003 National Assessment of 
Educational Progress, the most reliable nationwide study of educational 
achievement levels, reveal that while 74% of white public school fourth 
graders tested at the "basic" level, only 39% of black students did.91 The 
disparities grew at the next level, with 39% of whites testing proficient 
and 12% of blacks reaching that level. 92 Given these disparities, com-
bined with our nation's history, nothing prompted more concern in the 
early discussion of charter schools than the thought that they might be-
come havens for white families. 
So far the data does not suggest this has happened. Nationally, the 
proportion of blacks in charters is higher than the proportion in district 
schools; the opposite is true for whites. Thirty-one percent of charter 
students nationwide are black, compared to 17% of district school stu-
dents.93 Whites make up 45% of the charter school population and 58% 
of district school students.94 State-level studies reach similar conclusions. 
In California, where blacks make up 8% of the students in all public 
schools, they are 16% of the charter school population.95 In Texas, 
blacks are 14% of traditional public school students and 39% of those in 
charters.96 Findings from Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, Massachusetts, 
and North Carolina also indicate that charter schools attract equal or 
greater proportions of black students.97 
89. JAMES ANDERSON, THE EDUCATION OF BLACKS IN THE SOUTH, 1860-1935, at 11;-19 (1988); 
HEATHER A. D. WILLIAMS. SELF-TAUGHT: THE ROLE OF AFRICAN AMERICANS IN EDUCATING THE 
FREE PEOPLE, 1861-1871. at 67-79 (2005). 
90. ABIGAIL THERNSTROM & STEPHEN THERNSTROM. No EXCUSES: CLOSING THE RACIAL GAP 
IN LEARNING 11-23 (2003). See generally THE BLACK-WHITE TEST SCORE GAP (Christopher Jencks 
& Meredith Phillips eds., 1998). For a provocative argument that black educational attainment (as 
measured by high school and college graduation rates) is equal to that of whites after controlling for 
income, wealth and other parental assets, see DALTON CONLEY, BEING BLACK. LIVING IN THE RED: 
RACE, WEALTH AND SOCIAL POLICY IN AMERICA 55-81 (1999). 
91. NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., AMERICA'S CHARTER SCHOOLS: 
RESULTS FROM THE N AEP 2003 PILOT STUDY 5 (2004) [hereinafter NAEP PILOT STUDY]. 
92. Id. The test has three levels: ba, ic. proficient. and advanced. Id. at 4. 
93. Id. at 2. All the results reported here from the NAEP study concern fourth graders. 
94. Id. 
95. RON ZIMMER ET AL., CHARTER SCHOOL OPERATIONS AND PERFORMANCE: EVIDENCE 
FROM CALIFORNIA 27 (2003). 
96. TIMOTHY J. GRONBERG & DENNIS W. JANSEN. NAVIGATING NEWLY CHARTERED WATERS: 
AN ANALYSIS OF TEXAS CHARTER SCHOOL PERFORMANCE 12 (2001). available at http://www. 
texaspolicy.com/pdf/2001-05-17 -educ-newly.pdf. 
97. For Connecticut, see GARY MIRON & JERRY HORN. EVALUATION OF CONNECTICUT 
CHARTER SCHOOLS AND THE CHARTER SCHOOL INITIATIVE 44. available at http://www.wmich.edu/ 
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But national and state-level data has its limitations, a point which 
has been largely overlooked by the discussion to date regarding cream-
skimming and charter schools.98 If charter schools are disproportionately 
located in inner-city neighborhoods with disproportionate concentrations 
of African Americans, then cream-skimming of white students at subur-
ban or rural charter schools might be hidden from view when looking at 
statewide aggregate numbers.99 To begin to disentangle the effects of 
school location, we need to compare charter schools with the demo-
graphics of the school district where they are located. Such numbers are 
available for some states, and they also fail to support the cream-
skimming hypothesis. In California and Massachusetts, for example, 
charter schools have a higher proportion of black students than do the 
surrounding school districts. 'oo In Michigan, the percentages are "virtu-
ally identical."'o, 
If the data for black students fails to confirm the fears that they 
would be left behind as more privileged whites fled to charters, the data 
for Hispanics is more complicated. Like blacks, Hispanics underperform 
whites on important educational indicators, so evidence that Hispanics 
did not have the same ability to access the deregulated educational mar-
ketplace would be of concern. I02 At the national level, Hispanics make 
evalctr/charter/cCcs3val_final_repor!.pdf. For Florida, see Tim R. Sass, Charter Schools and Student 
Achievement in Florida, 1 EDUC. FIN. & POL'y 91 (2006). For Illinois, see CHRISTOPHER NELSON & 
GARY MIRON, THE EVALUATION OF THE ILLINOIS CHARTER SCHOOL REFORM (2002). For Massa-
chusetts, see PAUL REVILLE ET AL., MASSACHUSETTS CHARTER SCHOOLS & THEIR FEEDER 
DISTRICTS: A DEMOGRAPHIC ANALYSIS (2004), available at http://www.renniecenter.orglresearch_ 
docs/0411_CharterSchools.pdf. For North Carolina, see ROBERT BIFULCO & HELEN F. LADD, THE 
IMPACTS OF CHARTER SCHOOLS ON STUDENT ACHIEVEMENT: EVIDENCE FROM NORTH CAROLINA 40 
(2004), available at http://www.pubpol.duke.edu/people/faculty/ladd/SAN04-01.pdf. 
98. Most discussions of cream-skimming in charter schools use national comparisons. See, e.g., 
Tomiko Brown-Nagin, Toward a Pragmatic Understanding of Status-Consciousness: The Case of De-
regulated Education, 50 DUKE L.J. 753, 769-70 (2000). 
99. See infra note 100 (discussing how Massachusetts charter schools are disproportionately lo-
cated in cities); see also Jeffrey R. Henig & Jason A. MacDonald, Locational Decisions of Charter 
Schools: Probing the Market Metaphor, 83 Soc. SCI. Q. 962, 977 (2002) (discussing how Washington, 
D.C. charter schools are disproportionately located in neighborhoods with high numbers of minorities 
and in neighborhoods with high levels of home ownership). 
100. ZIMMER ET AL., supra note 95, at 28-29 (discussing California findings). Massachusetts char-
ter schools are disproportionately concentrated in urban areas. REVILLE ET AL., supra note 97, at 4. 
At the district level, the greatest disparity exists in Boston, where 67% of charter students are black in 
a district that is 46% black. /d. at 7. Charters in other urban districts also draw disproportionate 
numbers of African American students. Id. For Massachusetts suburban and rural districts, charter 
schools are slightly less likely to have African American students (charters are 2.5 % black in these 
districts, whereas the overall student population is 3.5% black), but blacks are so scarce in these dis-
tricts it is hard to assess the import of the 1 % difference for the larger cream-skimming question. Id. 
101. Randall W. Eberts & Kevin M. Hollenbeck, Impact of Charter School Attendance on Student 
Achievement in Michigan 10 (W. E. Upjohn Ins!. for Employment Research, Working Paper No. 02-
080, 2002), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=316562; see also GARY MIRON & CHRISTOPHER 
NELSON, WHAT'S PUBLIC ABOUT CHARTER SCHOOLS? LESSONS LEARNED ABOUT CHOICE AND 
ACCOUNTABILITY 75 (2002). 
102. Using the same NAEP indicators I previously referenced, 43% of Hispanic public school 
fourth graders tested at the "basic" level and 14% at the "proficient" level. These numbers are slightly 
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up a slightly greater percentage of charter school students than of district 
school students. 11I3 At the state level, the picture is more mixed: Hispan-
ics are underrepresented in charter schools in California, Illinois, and 
Massachusetts, equally represented in Florida and Texas, and overrepre-
sented in Connecticut.](]4 The district-level data, in the two states where 
it exists, is consistent with state-level findings from those states. IDS 
The discussion of Hispanics adds an important level of complexity 
to the black-white dichotomy. The cream-skimming argument, particu-
larly in its race-based form, is grounded on the relative political and eco-
nomic power of whites over blacks. But what are the cream-skimming 
implications if the district schools lose whites and blacks? What if, in 
other words, traditional public schools lose a portion of the relatively 
privileged and relatively disadvantaged? That is (at least to date) part of 
the California story, where both whites and blacks are disproportionately 
drawn into charters and away from district schools, leaving the tradi-
tional public system increasingly Hispanic. \06 
2. Class 
Even if the evidence does not confirm cream-skimming for African 
Americans and is mixed for Hispanics, that is not the end of the story. 
Poverty, a significant predictor of political power and educational 
achievement, also warrants discussion. Indeed, a trend in educational 
policy research is to emphasize the salience of class, even suggesting that 
some differences that have long been considered race based are actually 
largely a derivative of economic status. 107 In education, the typical class 
measure is the percentage of a school's students who are eligible for fed-
erally subsidized (either free or reduced-price) lunches. The available 
evidence does not show class-based cream-skimming. According to the 
most recent national study, charter and district schools serve roughly 
equal numbers of low income students: 44% of traditional public school 
students and 42% of charter students are eligible for free or reduced-
price lunch. lOs This measurement has its drawbacks. Some charter 
higher than the numbers for black students. but still considerably lower than those for white students. 
See supra note 91 and accompanying text. 
103. NAEP PILOT STUDY. supra note 91. at 2; OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY SECRETARY. U.S. DEP'T 
OF EDUC .. POLICY AND PROGRAM STUDIES SERVICES, EVALUATION OF THE PUBLIC CHARTER 
SCHOOLS PROGRAM: FINAL REPORT 24 (2004). 
104. See, e.g., GRONBERG & JANSEN. supra note 96. at 12: MIRON & HORN. supra note 97. at 44: 
NELSON & MIRON. supra note 97. at 97: REVILLE ET AL .. supra note 97, at 9: ZIMMER ET AL.. supra 
note 95. at 27: Sass. supra note 97. at 102. 
105. See REVILLE ET AL .. supra note 97. at 9: ZIMMER ET AL .. supra note 95. at 29-30. 
106. See ZIMMER ET AL .. supra note 95. at 27, 29. 
107. See, e.g., CONLEY, supra note 90, at 55-SI. 
lOS. NAEP PILOT STUDY, supra note 91. at 2. As with the data on race, the national numbers 
mask some differences from state to state. For example, charters serve a slightly higher percentage of 
lunch-eligible students in Texas and Washington. D.C. See GRONBERG & JANSEN, supra note 96, at 
12: Jack Buckley et aI., Are Charier School Students Harder to Educate? Evidence from Washington, 
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schools do not participate in the federal program, typically because they 
perceive the compliance costs to outweigh the financial benefit. 109 At-
taining a more precise assessment of the relative class status of charter 
and district school students will require additional research using meth-
ods other than measuring school lunch participationYo 
3. Parent and Student Motivation, Parental Education, and Student 
Achievement 
Even if the evidence does not confirm cream-skimming by either 
race or class, other cream-skimming claims deserve consideration. Cen-
tral among them is the possibility that charter schools will attract parents 
who attach greater value to, or are more engaged with, their children's 
schooling. It is certainly possible to imagine two schools in the same 
neighborhood, one a charter and the other a district school, with the 
same racial and economic mix of families, but where the charter school 
has a disproportionate share of parents who are committed to their chil-
dren's educational success. lll Similarly, perhaps the students of the char-
ter school take their own education more seriously. If true, these find-
ings would be significant, as parental and student motivation levels have 
long been understood to influence student achievement levels. 112 
Unfortunately, the available data on this issue is quite limited and 
leaves as many questions as answers. The only attempt to measure fam-
ily and student characteristics is a single study from Washington, D.C. In 
it, the authors survey students in charter and traditional public schools to 
D.C. 13 (Nat'l Ctf. for the Study of Privatization in Educ., Occasional Paper No. 96, 2004), available at 
http://ncspe.org/publications_files/OP96.pdf. The reverse is true in Florida, Illinois, and Massachu-
setts. See NELSON & MIRON, supra note 97; REVILLE ET AL., supra note 97, at 10; Sass, supra note 97, 
at 102. In Michigan both district and charter schools serve an equal number of lunch-eligible students. 
MIRON & NELSON, supra note 101, at 78; Eberts & Hollenbeck, supra note 101, at 10. In California, 
charter schools serve lower proportions of free and reduced lunch-eligible students. MARGARET E. 
RAYMOND, THE PERFORMANCE OF CALIFORNIA CHARTER SCHOOLS 11 (2003), available at 
http://credo.stanford.edu/downloads/ca_charcsch.pdf. Under an expanded definition of "disadvan-
taged," California charter students are indistinguishable from district students. DAVID ROGOSA, 
STUDENT PROGRESS IN CALIFORNIA CHARTER SCHOOLS, 1999-2002, at 3-4 (2003), available at 
http://www-stat.stanford.edu/-raglapilcharter9902.pdf. In California, students are identified as "So-
cioeconomically Disadvantaged" if neither of the student's parents has a high school diploma or if the 
student qualifies for subsidized lunch. [d. at 3. Under this measure charters and noncharters both 
serve almost identical numbers of disadvantaged students (49% for charters, 48% for traditional pub-
lic schools). [d. at 4. 
109. Forty percent of California charter schools, for example, did not report subsidized lunch eli-
gibility. See RAYMOND, supra note 108, at 11. 
110. Some researchers have suggested using parent surveys to compare household incomes of 
charter and district school families. MIRON & NELSON, supra note 101, at 79. 
111. As Amy Stuart Wells and her colleagues argue, even in those cases "when charter schools 
look similar to regular public schools in terms of the racial/ethnic and even socioeconomic makeup of 
their students, they often may enroll the students from the local community with the most involved 
parents or the strongest support systems." Amy Stuart Wells et aI., Charter Schools and Racial and 
Class Segregation: Yet Another Sorting Machine?, in A NOTION AT RISK: PRESERVING PUBLIC 
EDUCATION AS AN ENGINE FOR SOCIAL MOBILITY 169,207 (Richard D. Kahlenberg ed., 2000). 
112. KAHLENBERG, supra note 73, at 51-55, 61-67. 
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determine whether one group of students was more likely to have higher 
educational aspirations, get good grades, have friends with good grades, 
get in trouble at school, or use bad language.1\3 The authors find no sta-
tistically significant differences between charter and district school stu-
dents on these measures. 114 They also try to learn from students about 
their parents' level of engagement with their education. Here, too, they 
find that students in charter schools are no more likely to report that 
their parents talk to them about school or know a lot about their 
school. I 15 This last finding appears to run contrary to the fear that char-
ters cream-skim the most active and knowledgeable parents. However, 
more research is needed in order to test parental engagement levels di-
rectly, rather than through student assessment. 
Another potential difference between district and charter parents 
concerns parental education levels, which we know to be a powerful in-
fluence on student achievement. 116 Unfortunately, only one state-level 
study examines this factor. Robert Bifulco and Helen Ladd report that 
parents of students in North Carolina charter schools are more likely to 
have college degrees and less likely to be high school dropouts than dis-
trict school parents. 1I7 This finding raises intriguing questions given that 
North Carolina charters have disproportionate numbers of black stu-
dents. Here, then, the cream-skimming evidence points in conflicting di-
rections, as charters have disproportionate numbers of well-educated 
parents and black parents. Given that blacks are less likely to be college 
graduates than are whites, and more likely to be high school dropouts, 
this combination of findings is counterintuitive. One (but not the only) 
possibility is that among a relatively disadvantaged population (blacks), 
the more educationally advantaged seek charter schools. More research 
is needed to explain what drives the North Carolina results and to see if 
they are replicated in other states. 
The final area of possible cream-skimming to consider is selection 
based on students' academic ability, as measured by standardized tests. 
On the one hand, we might expect cream-skimming along this dimension, 
for this is an area where overseas choice and U.S. magnet programs saw 
substantial cream-skimming, and many predicted that charters would 
lead to the same result. On the other hand, there is an equally compel-
ling reason to doubt that prediction. Given that most students start their 
academic careers in traditional public schools, and those who do well 
there have fewer reasons to leave, perhaps our hypothesis should be that 
113. Buckley et al..s/lpra note 108. at IR. 
114. 1£1. at 21.31i. 
115. Id. at 17-18.21. 35. 
I Iii. Dalton Conley finds. for example. that the head of household's level of education is the most 
powerful single predictor of whether a child in that house will complete high school and college. 
CONLEY. supra note 90. at 69-75. Conley finds that parental education levels matter more than race. 
income. or wealth (including liquid assets and home value). Id. 
117. BIFULCO & LADD. supra note ,}7. at 40. 
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charters would draw disproportionate numbers of struggling students. 
The evidence on this is limited and somewhat confounded by what are 
known in educational research as "school effects." In other words, when 
we compare the achievement levels of students in charters to those in dis-
trict schools, we cannot easily tell whether differences are attributable to 
characteristics of the student or of the school. 118 With that caveat, the 
fact that students in charter schools perform no better than, and some-
times worse than, their district school counterparts,119 provides some evi-
dence that charters do not cream-skim academicallyYo 
4. Conclusions, and Cautions, Regarding Cream-Skimming 
To sum up, I would suggest that the evidence to date-while not 
unequivocal-does not confirm the cream-skimming hypothesis. For 
race, blacks are disproportionately in charters,121 whites are dispropor-
tionately in traditional public schools,122 and Hispanics are fairly evenly 
distributed between the twO. 123 These findings should matter to those 
who believe that white flight to charters combined with the "green fol-
lows white" principle l24 will diminish support for district schools. Look-
ing at class measures, poor students are distributed fairly equally be-
tween the two types of schools. Turning to other measures of privilege, 
the evidence, while limited, does not point strongly in either direction. 
Nationally it appears that the students who attend charters and district 
public schools are of roughly equal academic ability;125 more educated 
parents choose charters in North Carolina;126 and charter parents are no 
more or less engaged in their children's education in Washington, D.C. 127 
However, it would be a mistake to suggest, as some charter school 
proponents have recently done, that charter schools in fact serve a more 
"at-risk" population of students. l28 First of all, other than attracting a 
greater proportion of black students, there is no dimension where charter 
schools consistently draw less privileged students. Moreover, charter 
118. Standardized tests typically used to measure achievement levels are generally administered 
in the spring. Accordingly, even comparing a group of students who are in their first year at a charter 
with a district school cohort necessarily implicates school effects, at least to a degree, because students 
have been in the school for at least half of one year. 
119. NAEP PILOT STUDY, supra note 91; NELSON ET AL., supra note 58. 
120. For arguments to this effect, see LEWIS C. SOLOMON & PETE GOLDSCHMIDT, COMPARISON 
OF TRADITIONAL PUBLIC SCHOOLS AND CHARTER SCHOOLS ON RETENTION: SCHOOL SWITCHING, 
AND ACHIEVEMENT GROWTH 13-14, 21 (2004), and ZIMMER ET AL., supra note 95, at 25-26. 
121. BIFULCO & LADD, supra note 97, at to. 
122. See NAEP PILOT STUDY, supra note 91, at 2. 
123. [d. 
124. See supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text. 
125. See NAEP PILOT STUDY, supra 91, at 4--8. 
126. See supra note 118 and accompanying text. 
127. See supra notes 114-16 and accompanying text. 
128. See, e.g., Howell & West, supra note 64, at 76 ("As schools of choice, charters are likely to 
attract students who are not doing well in their traditional public schools. Moreover, many charter 
schools explicitly target at-risk students."). 
HeinOnline -- 2007 U. Ill. L. Rev. 863 2007
No.3] CHARTER SCHOOLS 863 
school advocates eager to rebut claims of cream-skimming (and eager to 
explain uninspiring academic achievement results)'2~ overlook the fact 
that the demographic makeup of the schools could change. State and 
federal studies of charter student demographics have found varying en-
rollment patterns over time, which is not surprising given that the market 
is new and growing rapidly.I3O 
Indeed, it is worth watching whether the federal No Child Left Be-
hind (NCLB) legislation 131 increases cream-skimming by charters, espe-
cially at the high school level. Under NCLB, high schools-including 
charters-are judged by the percentage of their tenth graders who pass 
state tests.132 Each year, an increasing percentage of tenth graders must 
meet state proficiency levels for the school to satisfy federal require-
ments. 133 Under federal law, schools are not judged based on how much 
each student's test scores improve while the student is at that school. '34 
Instead, a school is thought to have improved if this year's tenth grade 
class performs better than last year's.135 This regime gives a school two 
choices. It can teach better-and for high schools this means teaching 
better in the ninth grade and the first half of tenth grade, since the tests 
upon which the entire school is judged are administered mid-way 
through the sophomore year. Alternatively, the school can try to recruit 
students who enter the ninth grade with higher test scores, because they 
are more likely to test well eighteen months later. Because schools are 
just beginning to face significant sanctions for repeatedly failing to meet 
federal standards, it is too early to tell whether charter schools will re-
spond with increased cream-skimming. However, the law creates incen-
tives for them to do so. 136 
129. See supra note 58. 
130. Nationally. for example. between 1999 and 2002 the proportion of charter students who were 
black. as well as the proportion eligible for subsidized lunch increased. while the proportion of charter 
students who were white declined. See OFFICE OFTHE DEPUTY SECRETARY. supra note 103. at 24-25. 
[n Connecticut. charter schools have over time attracted increasing numbers of black parents and par-
ents with lower income and formal education levels. See MIRON & HORN. supra note 97. at 44-45. In 
Michigan, the first studies of charter schools found that charters did not serve the same percentages of 
minority and poor children as did district schools, but more recent data indicates that now they do. 
For a discussion of these trends. see Eberts & Hollenbeck. supra note 101. at 10. 
131. No Child Left Behind Act of 2001. Pub. L. No. 107-110. liS Stat. 1425 (2002) (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.c.). 
132. Id. § 1111(b)(3)(C). 115 Stat. at 1449-52 (codified at 20 U.S.c. § 6311(b)(3)(C). 
133. Id. 
134. Id. 
135. [n response to extensive criticism of this portion of the law, the Bush administration recently 
said it would grant ten states permission to experiment with "growth models." These models allow 
schools to be judged on the academic growth of their students. even if their scores do not meet state 
standards. Nick Anderson. Bush Administration Grants Leeway on 'No Child' Rules. WASI·!. POST. 
Nov. 22. 2005. at A I. Twenty states recently submitted requests to be among the ten allowed to use 
growth models. Diana Jean Schemo. 20 States Ask for Flexibility in School Law. N.Y. TIMES. Feb. 22. 
2006. at A12. 
136. Cf Glennerster, supra note IS, at 1271 (arguing that judging English schools principally by 
test scores gives incentive to avoid students who will depress scores). 
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Moreover, though the current evidence does not support the claim 
that, in the aggregate, charters cream-skim, the data has limits. For ex-
ample, individual schools can engage in marketing and other practices 
that might favor certain groups of parents. i37 Some charters have (unen-
forceable) admissions contracts requiring parents to volunteer time in 
the school and participate in other school activities, which might deter 
parents who are less able or inclined to support the work of the school. 138 
Nor is it unheard of for students to be deterred from applying at some 
charter schools on the grounds that another school might serve them bet-
ter. Over my years of involvement with a Washington, D.C., charter 
school, I have learned of more than a few students with special needs or 
attendance problems who have arrived at our doors at the encourage-
ment of another charter school to which they had considered applying.139 
Cream-skimming can also result once a school acquires a certain reputa-
tion in the community.i40 For example, some believe that the well-
regarded Knowledge is Power Program (KIPP) middle schools have be-
come known in some communities as places for highly motivated kids 
and families. i41 Accordingly, some teachers in referring elementary 
schools tend to encourage only those students and families to apply.i42 
C. Markets, Regulation, and Equality in Schooling 
Earlier I pointed out how the charter school debate raised questions 
about the relationship between privatization and equality, with some 
charter skeptics arguing that expanding the role of markets in education 
137. ZiMMER ET AL., supra note 95, at 21 ("Schools ... can indirectly influence the type of stu-
dents who apply by focusing their missions or curricula on specific types of students such as gifted and 
talented or at-risk students."). 
138. Wells et aI., supra note 111, at 205--06. More research is needed to determine whether this 
practice has this effect. Wells speculates that it might. On the other hand, one charter school leader 
told me that parents at his school interpret the contracts as a welcome, if surprising, statement that 
they are wanted in the school, a government institution from which they had long felt excluded. This 
advocate suggests that parents at traditional public schools would also welcome the contracts, and that 
their unenforceable nature minimizes the likelihood that they would serve as exclusionary devices. 
139. This is an area warranting further study. Some research has been done regarding schools as 
choosers in the U.S. educational marketplace. See MARTIN CARNOY ET AL., THE CHARTER SCHOOL 
DUST-UP: EXAMINING THE EVIDENCE ON ENROLLMENT AND ACHIEVEMENT 31 (2005); Carol Ascher 
& Nathalis Wamba, An Examination of Charter School Equity, in SCHOOL CHOICE AND DIVERSITY: 
WHAT THE EVIDENCE SAYS 77, 81-82 (Janelle T. Scott ed., 2005). But insufficient attention has been 
paid to the subtle ways in which schools of choice may steer students away. Kevin G. Weiner & Ken-
neth R. Howe, Steering Toward Separation: The Policy and Legal Implications of 'Counseling' Special 
Education Students Away from Charter Schools, in SCHOOL CHOICE AND DIVERSITY, supra, at 93,99-
107 (reporting the absence of a systematic large-scale study of whether charter schools steer special 
education students away, but noting anecdotal evidence to that effect). 
140. Starn bach and Becker report on the founding of one charter school that served dispropor-
tionate numbers of wealthy white students. Stambach & Becker, supra note 65, at 164. The reason, 
they assert, was that "informational meeting[s] had been held in private, upscale homes from which 
low-income families had been excluded." Id. at 169. 
141. CARNOY ET AL.,supra note 139, at 51-65. 
142. Id.at55-59. 
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would necessarily harm less advantaged children and families. '43 In con-
cluding this discussion of cream-skimming, it is worth returning to that 
issue. What lessons can we draw from the absence of cream-skimming in 
charter schools compared to its prevalence in overseas choice and U.S. 
magnet programs? I would suggest two. First, the differences reinforce 
an important yet often overlooked principle: in constructing a choice 
program, the specific design is highly significanL '44 Second, despite the 
powerful rhetoric deployed in the debate over government versus mar-
kets, neither side has a monopoly on promoting equality. To the con-
trary, it appears that in certain circumstances deregulation can increase 
access for the less advantaged, while government limitations on the free 
market are sometimes necessary to promote equity. 
Consider first the question of selectivity in admissions. Magnet and 
specialty schools are typically allowed to select all or a portion of their 
students from among those who apply. The same is true of choice 
schools overseas. Charter schools, by contrast, are prohibited from 
choosing students and must use a lottery if oversubscribed. Even if some 
charters occasionally fail to comply, as I suggested might be the case,145 
they undoubtedly employ less student selection than a regime that ex-
pressly permits it. The prohibition against selective admissions likely ex-
plains part of why charters do not cream-skim. If I am correct, then 
regulating the market by restricting schools' ability to selectively admit 
students promotes equity. 
By contrast, another distinction between legal regimes' suggests how 
deregulation can promote equity. Magnet schools offer options to fami-
lies, but the law leaves in place barriers to entry for new providers. In-
deed, under magnet and other similar choice programs in the United 
States, new providers are excluded, as choice is limited to the state school 
system. Importantly, before the advent of charters, when the govern-
ment had a monopoly on publicly funded choice, it frequently opted for 
programs that expressly discriminated in admissions based on student 
ability. Thus, there is some irony in opponents of market-based deregu-
lation premising their argument on evidence of cream-skimming in gov-
ernment-run magnet schools.'4/i 
Charter school laws, by contrast, make it relatively easy for new 
providers to enter the market. If allowing new market entrants has pro-
duced choice without the cream-skimming associated with the earlier 
public choice programs, it is worth exploring why that is so. Though ad-
143. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text. 
144. JOHN E. COONS & STEPHEN D. SUGARMAN. SCHOLARSHIPS FOR CHILDREN vii (1992). 
145. See discussion supra Part III.B. 
146. This brings to mind Gary Peller's argument that while the left has long been concerned that a 
move toward markets would undermine equity in public schools. ··the 'public' character of schools that 
is defended against the evils of privatization is more or less a total fantasy." Peller. supra note 32, at 
1005. For Peller. "American public schools by and large represent the paradigm of alienating. unre-
sponsive. often corrupl. inefficient. and cullurally repressive social institutions." 1£1. 
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ditional research is needed to confirm this conclusion, I suspect it has 
something to do with the supply side-in particular, the mission-driven 
education providers. These market entrants include neighborhood 
groups and community-based nonprofits, many of whom see charter 
schools as a vehicle for advancing a community service or antipoverty 
mission. 147 While we might typically think that "[a ]ny school entrepre-
neur acting rationally would seek to exclude pupils who would drag 
down the overall performance score of the school,,,148 the values of mis-
sion-driven charter schools may cause them to act differently. As a re-
sult, these mission-driven schools are more likely than other charters to 
recruit low-income students, special education students, or English-
language learners. 149 Evidence from one jurisdiction suggests that mis-
sion-driven schools bear significant responsibility for the absence of 
cream-skimming among charters as a whole. ISO Here, then, is one final 
lesson for market-based reformers: while most of the discussion in the 
consumer choice literature focuses on the buyer (in this case parents and 
families), the supply side (school providers) matters just as much. 
IV. Do CHARTERS UNDERMINE SUPPORT FOR FUNDING DISTRICT 
SCHOOLS? 
If the evidence does not confirm cream-skimming, what threat do 
charters pose to traditional public schools? Remember that cream-
skimming is feared in part because of its secondary effects-that losing 
relatively privileged students and parents will cause district schools, over 
time, to lose legitimacy, support, and funding. l5l In this Part, I will look 
at the broader question of the impact of charter schools on district 
schools and ask whether, even in the absence of cream-skimming, char-
ters nonetheless pose a threat. I will first outline the way in which advo-
cates of traditional public schools saw charters as a threat to funding, and 
discuss how some of the rhetorical claims of charter advocates fed these 
fears. I will then examine how charter schools have increasingly turned 
to private philanthropy to supplement their public funding. This largely 
unanticipated phenomenon, I will argue, renders charter schools a finan-
cially vulnerable reform. Although reliance on private fundraising calls 
into question the stability of charters, it also highlights an emerging de-
velopment in their relationship with traditional public schools. I will 
conclude by exploring this development. My suggestion is that the eco-
nomic incentives of charter operators, combined with structural features 
of education funding, actually create the possibility that charters will be-
147. Natalie Lacireno-Paquet et aI., Creaming versus Cropping: Charter School Enrollment Prac-
tices in Response to Market Incentives, 24 EDUC. EVALUATION & POL'y ANALYSIS 145, 149-51 (2002). 
148. Glennerster, supra note 15, at 127l. 
149. Lacireno-Paquet et aI., supra note 147, at 145,153-55. 
150. Id. 
151. See supra notes 58-78 and accompanying text. 
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come an ally for increased public funding for all schools, including dis-
trict schools. 
A. The Fear of Losing Funding 
Critics of school choice argue that the long-term impact of charter 
schools will be to undermine support for funding district schools. 152 At 
first blush, the claim might seem to depend entirely on charters having a 
cream-skimming impact; in other words, if the more privileged parents 
and their political capital leave the district schools for charters, then dis-
trict schools will have less support. In this formulation, the argument 
would be considerably weakened, and perhaps repudiated in full, by the 
absence of cream-skimming effects discussed in Part II. But there is an-
other way to state the funding argument that is independent of cream-
skimming. To the extent that charter schools are predicated on the no-
tion that they can achieve better results with the same or less money than 
district schools receive, charters necessarily threaten those who defend 
district schools' performance. In so doing, they can undermine political 
support for district schools, which over time might result in less funding. 
Furthermore, many advocates for traditional public schools have seen 
the move toward market-based reforms as a direct challenge to their 
claim that poor children need additional resources devoted to their edu-
cation. Richard Leone, President of the Twentieth Century Fund, ex-
plains: 
While there is undeniable evidence that highly targeted and very 
large additions to current educational expenditures would enhance 
the education of poor children, the political realities of the 1990's 
make such a remedy a nonstarter. Innovations involving organiza-
tional and management changes seem especially attractive since, by 
contrast, they usually are described as involving lower, or even no, 
152. The fear that privatization will lead to reduced support for the public sector has been made 
in a variety of contexts. including homeowners' associations. private policing. and welfare reform. For 
example. Sheryll Cashin questions the growth of homeowners' associations. in which residents pri-
vately provide their own road repairs. recreation centers. sanitation. and snow removal. Sheryll 
Cashin. Privatized Communities and the "Secession of the Success/ui": Democracy and Fairness Be-
yond the Gate. 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1675. 1676-77 (2001). Cashin suggests that "these private con-
tractual arrangements for the provision of formerly 'public' services have put the nation on a course 
toward civic secession." [d. at 1677. As homeowners increasingly feel an obligation only to those in 
their private community. says Cashin. they will feel less empathy for those outside the gates. [d. al 
1684-85. 1690. Homeowners will start to question whether they should support services for others. 
which ultimately will lead to "a reduced tax base for addressing the problems of the poor." [d. al 1690. 
Similarly. David Sklansky suggests that private policing can end up displacing public law enforcement. 
As Sklansky asks. "Why should Bel Air residents vote for higher taxes to pay for policing throughout 
Los Angeles. when they can-and do-hire private patrols for their own neighborhood?" David Alan 
Sklansky. Private Police and Democracy. 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 89. 97 (2006): see also David Alan 
Sklansky. The Private Police. 46 UCLA L. REV. 1165. 1223-24 (1999). Finally. in the context of wel-
fare reform. Matthew Diller argues that the privatization movement was built on claims that competi-
tion from the private sector would save money. Diller. supra note 37. at 1751-52. Diller argues that 
privatization has allowed public officials to cut rolls in a manner that spared them "from the political 
consequences of appearing harsh and uncaring for the poor." [d. at 1757. 
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increases in spending. Thus, advocates of such ideas as vouchers, 
choice, privatization, charter schools, and a variety of other current 
proposals for changes in public education have found an interested 
audience all across the political spectrum. 153 
Similarly, some school finance advocates also see charters as a 
threat to their movement. Over the last thirty years, litigation challeng-
ing state and local school financing has been an important mechanism for 
those who seek to increase funding for low-income schools.154 Money 
figures greatly in these lawsuits, because plaintiffs frequently rely on the 
fact that the allegedly inadequate school districts are funded at a lower 
level than some of the adequate ones. Of the state courts that have 
reached the issue, most have ruled that there is reliable evidence that 
spending is correlated with educational opportunity.155 However, char-
ters and other market reforms could jeopardize this progress. As two 
school finance experts argue, if alternatives outside the traditional public 
system are premised on the notion that schools do not need more fund-
ing to succeed, they "may subvert the goals of the school funding re-
formers" by reducing "taxpayer incentive to improve public school fund-
ing. "156 
The fears of district school supporters are reinforced by some of the 
rhetoric of school choice proponents. In the battle for public opinion, 
arguments against spending more on schools are often expressly linked 
to demands for choice. For example, during the 2004 presidential cam-
paign, Jay Greene and Marcus Winters criticized John Kerry for clinging 
"to the habitually fruitless path of spending more money," rather than 
endorsing the promising reforms of high-stakes testing and school 
choice.157 As the state has begun to lose its monopoly over public educa-
tion, these critics cite the market-oriented reforms as proof of their claim 
that district schools do not need more money. This is most pronounced 
in the context of private choice initiatives such as vouchers or tuition tax 
credits. As researchers from the Heritage Foundation argue, because 
153. Richard Leone, Foreword to HARD LESSONS: PUBLIC SCHOOLS AND PRIVATIZATION, at v 
(Carol Ascher, Norm Fruchter, & Robert Berne eds., 1996). 
154. Dozens of books and hundreds of law review articles have been devoted to the topic of 
school finance litigation. For thoughtful discussions of the current state of school finance litigation, 
see John Dayton & Anne Dupre, School Funding Litigation: Who's Winning the War?, 57 V AND. L. 
REV. 2351 (2004), and James E. Ryan & Thomas Saunders, Foreword to Symposium on School Fi-
nance Litigation: Emerging Trends or New Dead Ends?, 22 YALE L. & POL'y REV. 463 (2004). For a 
highly readable history of the litigation effort, see PETER SCHRAG, FINAL TEST (2003). 
155. For a survey of the state court decisions addressing this issue, see Dayton & Dupree, supra 
note 154, at 2378-79 n.158. 
156. [d. at 2411. 
157. Jay P. Greene & Marcus A. Winters, It's Elementary: Kerry Skips K-12, NAT'L REV. 
ONLINE, May 12, 2004, hnp:llnationalreview.comlcommentlgreene_winters200405120907.asp; see also 
CHUBB & MOE, supra note 53, at 218 (arguing for private school choice, rather than money); Kirk A. 
Johnson & Krista Kafer, Why More Money Will Not Solve America's Education Crisis, HERITAGE 
FOUND., June 11, 2001, http://www.heritage.orglResearchlEducationlBG1448.cfm (same); David 
Salisbury, Op-Ed., Real Education Reform, N.Y. SUN, Feb. 17,2005, at 8 (same). 
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private schools cost less than district ones, private school choice "may 
yield billions in savings to states and schools districts."15x 
However, the claim is not limited to the private choice movement. 
Some charter school advocates have argued that they could achieve bet-
ter results without more money. According to the founder of a Boston 
charter, for example, his school's success was a result of "[n]ot money, 
but effort."15~ Another charter advocate took an even more aggressive 
rhetorical position, arguing that charter schools "can produce quality 
schooling at a fraction of the cost of traditional public schools."ltiO Edison 
Schools, the nation's largest for-profit education company, made a modi-
fied version of this argument, asserting that with the same amount of 
money district schools received it could achieve better results-and still 
have some money left over for profit. lfil The willingness of some charter 
supporters to embrace claims for reduced spending caused prominent re-
searcher and district school advocate Amy Wells to conclude, with re-
gret, that "free-market reformers won the battle for the soul of a move-
ment that promised to be so much more than merely a deregulatory 
reform."lfi2 
B. Charter Funding and Private Philanthropy 
In this Section, I will outline the role of private philanthropy in sup-
porting charter schools and argue that dependence on private fund raising 
renders charters financially vulnerable. This argument sets the stage for 
Part IV.C, where I will argue that charter advocates are moving away 
from the claim that charters save money and increasingly focusing on se-
curing additional public funding. 
158. Johnson & Kafer. supra note 157: see also Leslie Andrews, Magic Bullet: Here's a Long-Term 
Way to Fix State and Local Btulget Deficits. AM. ENTERPRISE. Oct.-Nov. 2003, at 42, 42 ("[S]chool 
choice is more than just an educational innovation. It also has the potential to make education spend-
ing more efficient. and thus to help reduce state and local budget pressures. Competition lowers the 
number of dollars needed to achieve good academic results. "): Clint W. Green. Private Schools Work: 
Less Can Mean More. ACTON INST., Aug. 14. 2002. http://www.acton.org/ppolicy/comment.article. 
php?id=LOO (arguing that "[cJompetition, accountability. mission, and the overwhelming presence of 
religion in [private and parochial] schools demonstrate that schools can indeed succeed while spending 
substantially less than public schools"). 
IS'!. Brett Peiser. Charter Schools: Affordable Reform. BOSTON HERALD. Mar. 13.2000. at 23 
("We could always pay teachers higher salaries. give students a second set of textbooks or take them 
on more extensive field trips. But what we are finding through charter schools is that reform is often 
inexpensive."). 
160. Thomas W. Carroll. No More Spending. CRISIS. Feb. 1'!98. at 14, available at http://www. 
catholiceducation.orgiarticlesieducationied007I.html: see also David Salisbury. School Choice Can 
Help States Meet Blldget Challenges. CATO INST .. Feb. 4. 2003. http://www.cato.orglresearchiarticlesi 
salishury-030204.html ("'States could also save money by expanding dramatically the number of char-
ter schools. "). 
161. BRIAN P. GILL ET AL.. INSPIRATION. PERSPIRATION AND TIME: OPERATIONS AND 
ACHIEVEMENT IN EDISON SCHOOLS 9 (2005). 
162. Amy Stuart Wells. Why Pllblic Policy Fails /() Live Up /() the Potclltial of Charter School Re-
j(Jrm: An illlmtil/{:Iion. ill WHERE CHARTER SCHOOL POI.1CY FAILS: THE PRORI.EMS OF 
ACCOUNTABILITY AND EQUITY I. 17 (Amy Stuart Wells ed., Teachers College Press 20(2). 
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Charters in fact typically receive fewer public dollars than tradi-
tional public schools-on average, nationwide, $1800 less per pupiJ.163 
Some charter schools simply get by with less, but others, including some 
of the nation's most well regarded, turn to private sources for money. 
For example, perhaps the best known charter schools in the country are 
the Knowledge is Power Program (KIPP) schools. Starting with a single 
site in Houston, the KIPP network has expanded to serve low-income 
students in cities across the country.l64 The Department of Education has 
identified KIPP schools as among the nation's most successful;165 USA 
Today calls them "probably the most successful charter schools in the 
U.S.;,,166 and President Bush cited the original school as "the best middle 
school in the city of Houston.,,167 Among KIPP's programmatic innova-
tions is a longer school day and year. KIPP students are in school from 
7:25 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. daily, every other Saturday, and for all but six 
weeks over the summer.168 Taken together, KIPP students spend 67% 
more time in school than typical district school students, according to co-
founder Michael Feinberg.169 
KIPP's academic success has been accompanied by, and depends 
upon, extraordinary fundraising. Innovations such as the longer school 
day and year require KIPP to pay its teachers 15% to 20% more to com-
pensate for the longer hours. KIPP's Dallas school, for example, annu-
ally spends $2000 per pupil more than district schools.170 At the national 
level, one of the KIPP founders predicted that expanding their network 
of schools would require KIPP to raise over $200 million in philanthropic 
dollars in the cities and states where they would open.l7l KIPP's success 
has drawn a wide range of well-placed supporters, including the Bush 
family and Gap founders Doris and Donald Fisher, who made a $25 mil-
lion gift. 172 
163. Chester E. Finn, Jr. & Eric Osberg, Foreword to THOMAS B. FORDHAM INST .• CHARTER 
SCHOOL FuNDING: INEQUITY'S NEXT FRONTIER, at viii (2005). 
164. OFFICE OF INNOVATION & IMPROVEMENT, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., SUCCESSFUL CHARTER 
SCHOOLS 35 (2004). 
165. See Rod Paige, Foreword to OFFICE OF INNOVATION & IMPROVEMENT, supra note 164, at v. 
166. Editorial, Charters: Success or Failure?, USA TODAY, Jan. 4, 2005, at 14A. 
167. President George w. Bush, Remarks on Education Reform and Parental Options (July 1, 
2003), http://www.dcpswatch.com/vouchers/03070I.htm ("I want to congratulate ... the KIPP Acad-
emy entrepreneurs who are challenging mediocrity on a daily basis and raising standards for those who 
in some communities have been condemned to failure."). 
168. OFFICE OF INNOVATION & IMPROVEMENT,supra note 164, at 35-36. 
169. The Success of Charter Schools: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Educ. and the Workforce, 
106th Congo (2000) [hereinafter Success of Charter Schools] (statement of Michael Feinberg, CEO and 
Co-founder, KIPP Foundation). 
170. Kent Fischer, KIPP Set to Open Doors to New School of Thought, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, 
May 19, 2003, at AI. 
171. Success of Charter Schools, supra note 169. 
172. Ira Carnahan, No Shortcuts, FORBES, Nov. 10, 2003, at 122. To pay for these costs at the 
flagship Houston KIPP school, First Lady Laura Bush presided over a fundraising dinner that featured 
honorary chairs President Bush and Barbara Bush and brought in over $750,000 for the school. Shelby 
Hodge, First Lady Attends KIPP Benefit, Hous. CHRON., Jan. 12,2002, at 9. 
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KIPP's fundraising efforts have been especially successful, and oth-
ers have followed their approach. Another frequently cited national 
model is Roxbury Preparatory Charter School in Boston, a middle school 
which has achieved impressive results on the Massachusetts statewide as-
sessment and was cited as exemplary by the U.S. Department of Educa-
tion. 173 Like KIPP, Roxbury Prep has an extended day for students, 
summer school, and an after-school homework center. 174 Roxbury Prep 
receives $9500 per student annually in public funding, but raises $3500 
per pupil more from private fundraising efforts.175 Similarly, the SEED 
Public Charter School, which advertises itself as the nation's first college 
preparatory urban boarding school, has attracted substantial acclaim and 
private money.176 Located in Washington, D.C., it combines day classes 
with after-school activities and dormitory living during the week.177 
President Bush recently praised SEED for the 100% college acceptance 
rate of its most recent graduating class.178 According to the Washington 
Post, the "idea of creating a highly structured urban boarding school for 
low-income children, who live on campus from Sunday night to Friday 
night, has attracted a powerful board of directors, $25 million in dona-
tions and support from the likes of Oprah Winfrey and Bill Gates. ,,179 
For some privatization advocates, the prominence of private philan-
thropy has its benefits.IHo The traditional market discipline argument for 
charter schools was that they would have to deliver a high quality prod-
uct to compete for students. In one sense, the battle for philanthropic 
dollars is simply an extension of that rationale, as schools compete to 
prove their worth to private donors. Moreover, perhaps private donors 
are better able to identify quality schools than the public sector. In addi-
tion, for those who seek to shrink government's role, even partially shift-
ing the responsibility for education funding from the public to the private 
sector is a step in the right direction. 
On the other hand, charter schools' reliance on private philanthropy 
is possibly the Achilles heel of this quasi-market reform. Many current 
173. OFFICE OF INNOVATION & IMPROVEMENT. supra note 164. at 47-50. 
174. John B. King. Jr.. FUlfilling the Hope of Brown v. Board of Education Through Charter 
Schools, in THE EMANCIPATORY PROMISE OF CHARTER SCHOOLS: TOWARD A PROGRESSIVE 
POLITICS OF SCHOOL CHOICE 55. 71 (Eric Rofes & Lisa M. Stulberg eds .. 2004). 
175. OFFICE OF INNOVATION & IMPROVEMENT. supra note 164. at 50: see also King. supra note 
174. at 71 (estimating that Roxbury Prep raises $2500 per student above the public allotment). 
176. The SEED Foundation, About the SEED Foundation, http://www.seedfoundation.com/ 
about/history. asp (last visited Feb. 19.2007). 
177. The SEED Foundation. What Is a SEED School? http://www.seedfoundation.coml 
WhaUs/index.asp (last visited Feb. 19.2007). 
178. Press Release, President and Mrs. Bush Discuss Helping America's Youth Initiative (Apr. 1. 
2005). http://www. whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005104/20050401-I.html. 
179. Spencer S. Hsu. Land Transfer Bill/neludes Provision Requiring School. WASH. POST. July 
20.2005, at B8. 
180. See Savas. supra note 25. at 1736 (noting that those who favor privatization understand that 
"voluntary action is needed to address social ills. as President George W. Bush stated in his inaugural 
address"). 
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charter operators are gambling on their ability to convince private fun-
ders to focus indefinitely on their problem (K-12 education) and solution 
(charter schools) above others. Education-particularly K-12 schooling 
for lower-class and minority students-now has the attention of lawmak-
ers, philanthropists, and the American public. As a result, an increasing 
amount of philanthropic giving is directed there. For example, in 1998 
foundations gave $620 million to elementary and secondary schools, and 
$1.07 billion to higher education.181 By 2003, giving to higher education 
had remained flat at $1.12 billion, but giving to K-12 education had dou-
bled to $1.23 billion.182 
However, no single social issue remains dominant. 183 The environ-
mental movement discovered this in the late 1980s and 1990s, when, after 
two decades of remarkable growth and sustained individual and founda-
tion giving, interest and money started to move to other causes. lB4 In ad-
dition, individual foundations change their focus, sometimes moving 
away completely from sectors that previously had been priorities. This 
shift may happen after thoughtful and strategic analysis, or simply be-
cause a new director has his own pet project. 18S For the de-funded sector 
and its constituents, the results are the same. This should be a particular 
concern to the charter school movement, as a majority of giving to school 
choice related causes comes from just two foundations-the Bill and 
Melinda Gates Foundation and the Walton Family Foundation. To-
gether, Gates and Walton gave six out of every ten foundation dollars 
that went to school choice in 2002.186 
181. See, e.g., ROBERT W. BAIRD & Co., INSIGHTS ON THE EDUCATION MARKET 2 (2005). 
182. Tamar Lewin, Young Students Become the New Cause for Big Donors, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 
2005, § 1, at 21; see also Lenkowsky, supra note 47, at 366 (noting that during the 1990s "[i]mportant 
shifts have occurred within some categories, such as education, where foundations now devote a larger 
share of their gifts to precollegiate schooling than they used to"). 
183. See Anthony Downs, Up and Down with Ecology-the "Issue-Attention Cycle," 28 PUB. INT. 
38, 38 (1972) (arguing that domestic problems are governed by an "issue-attention cycle," in which 
"American public attention rarely remains focused upon one domestic issue for very long," no matter 
its importance). 
184. MARK DOWIE, LOSING GROUND; AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTALISM AT THE CLOSE OF THE 
TWENTIETH CENTURY 3-4, 46, 49-53, 175-76 (1995). Other sectors have seen philanthropic interest 
rise and fall over the years. In 1965, for example, 3% of all giving to private charity went to the arts. 
By 2000 it was 6%. Meanwhile, the numbers were reversed for human services. In 1965, 14% of all 
private charitable giving was devoted to human services; by 2000 it was 9%. Virginia A. Hodgkinson, 
Individual Giving and Volunteering, in THE STATE OF NONPROFIT AMERICA, supra note 38, at 396. 
185. Michael Bailin, Director of the Edna McConnell Clark Foundation, for example, describes 
the disciplined process by which his foundation moved from trying to influence large public systems 
such as education, child protection, and criminal justice to focusing solely on the field of youth devel-
opment. Michael A. Bailin, Requestioning, Reimagining, and Retooling Philanthropy, 32 NONPROFIT 
& VOLUNTARY SECTOR Q. 635, 636 (2003). Former foundation executive Arnold Zurcher argues, by 
contrast, that new initiatives frequently match "the pet social or academic or the professional interests 
of a new head of a foundation or of some influential member of a foundation's staff." ARNOLD 1. 
ZURCHER, THE MANAGEMENT OF AMERICAN FOUNDATIONS 64 (1972). 
186. Bryan C. Hassel & Amy Way, Choosing to Fund Choice, in WITH THE BEST OF INTENTIONS: 
How PHILANTHROPY IS RESHAPING K-12 EDUCATION 183 (Frederick M. Hess ed., 2005). 
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The role of private philanthropy in funding successful charter 
schools, therefore, presents another paradox: deregulation has allowed 
school entrepreneurs to develop creative educational approaches and 
find alternative funding, yet the deregulated structure ensures the fund-
ing rests on uncertain ground. While public funding for schools can also 
rise and fall,187 government funds are generally considered more stable 
than private contributions. ISS Also, though charter schools are not alone 
in relying on private philanthropy,IS9 schools like KIPP and some of the 
others discussed here have been especially successful at raising enormous 
sums of money and spending it on schools in high-poverty neighbor-
hoods. As a result, increasing numbers of poor and working-class par-
ents see, and are encouraged to see, these schools as their children's best 
hope for a better life. Yet many of them rest on a partially privatized, 
precarious financial base. 
C. A New Constituency for Public Funding of Public Education? 
In Part IV.B, I argued that the economic vulnerability of charter 
schools poses a threat to their growth and continued existence. In this 
final section, I will investigate how charter schools are responding to that 
vulnerability. My argument will proceed in two steps. First, I will argue 
that charter school advocates are now less likely to emphasize cost-
savings as a rationale for school choice. Instead, charter school advo-
187. A famous example of this is the dramatic reduction in education spending in California after 
Proposition 13. After the California Supreme Court struck down that state's school financing system 
as inequitable, voters passed Proposition 13. which limited the ability of local districts to raise taxes in 
order to fund schools. Since then. California went from having the fifth·highest school spending in the 
nation to the forty-second-highest by the 1990s. For a discussion of these events. see William A. 
Fischel, How Serrano Caused Proposition 13. 12 J.L. & POL. 607. 607-13 (1996). In the nonprofit sec-
tor more generally, nonprofits have sometimes learned the hard way that government funding is not 
always stable. For example, nonprofits experienced a severe crisis in the I 980s when federal support 
for nonprofits declined by twenty-five percent. Salamon, supra note 38, at 3, 12. 
188. Karen A. Froelich, Diversification of Revenue Strategies: Evolving Resource Dependence in 
Nonprofit Organizations, 28 NONPROFIT & VOLUNTARY SECTOR Q. 246.255 (1999). 
189. As most people with a child in a traditional public school can attest, the giving opportunities 
are endless. District schools now raise money and in-kind contributions from parents. community 
members, local and national corporations. and foundations. Here too. fairness issues loom large. A 
RAND study of fundraising in Los Angeles-area schools found that although low-income districts had 
greater access to some sources (in parti':ular, foundations). in general the wealthier schools and 
wealthier districts could raise more. ZIMMER ET AL.. PRIVATE GIVING TO PUBLIC SCHOOLS AND 
DISTRICTS IN Los ANGELES COUNTY 57-59. 63-64 (2001). A potential source of future funding dis-
parities is the growth of Local Educatior Foundations (LEFs). which are foundations. often run by 
parents and local community members. devoted to raising money for individual schools and districts. 
One California study found a direct relationship between the average annual income for a district and 
the effectiveness of its LEF. In California school districts with family incomes less than $30.000. the 
LEFs raised an average of $9 per student annually. LEFs in districts with average annual incomes of 
more than $70.000, in contrast. raised more than $240 per student. Eric Brunner & Jon Sontelie. Cop-
ing with Serrano: Voluntary Contributions to California's Local Public Schools 19 (Nov. 1996) (unpub-
lished manuscript). http://www.spa.ucla.edu/ps/pdf/s99/PS294assign/Coping.pdf. A condensed version 
of this paper was presented at the National Tax Association's Eighty-Ninth Annual Conference on 
Taxation. 
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cates are devoting greater attention to the need for additional public 
funding to ensure school quality. Second, I will argue, perhaps counter-
intuitively, that the push for greater charter funding may well result in 
charter schools allying with district schools to achieve increased educa-
tion budgets for all schools. In this way, charter schools may become a 
new constituency for the government-run schools to which they were in-
tended to be an alternative. 
1. The Evolution a/the Debate over Charter Schools and Money 
In 2005, the Fordham Institute published a prominent report argu-
ing for public policy reform that would lead to increased charter fund-
ing. l90 Both the Fordham Institute and the report's coauthor, Chester 
Finn, have long been associated with the position that reforms such as 
choice and accountability are more important than money. Charter 
School Funding: Inequity's Next Frontier, however, reflects a shift in 
tone. It is premised on the notion that funding shortfalls for charter 
schools undermine school quality,191 and that private philanthropy is not 
a sufficiently sustainable substitute. l92 "Charter schools are being starved 
of needed funds in almost every community and state," argue Finn and 
Osberg.\93 According to them, these funding disparities matter the most 
in inner-city communities. 194 "That's where today's greatest education 
challenges are found, where charter schools are most often located, and 
where disadvantaged and minority families have the greatest need for 
decent education options for their daughters and sons.,,195 
In the highly politicized debate over how much funding schools 
need to succeed, the Fordham report takes a somewhat different rhetori-
cal position than school choice proponents who claim the district schools 
do not need increased funding. As an example, compare the rhetoric re-
garding what $10,000 can buy. A couple of years ago, the Manhattan In-
stitute's Jay Greene, who is among the leading scholars and advocates 
arguing against increased school funding, criticized a private fundraising 
initiative on behalf of New York schools.196 Greene argued that the 
fundraising was unnecessary because taxpayers spent more than $10,000 
annually per student on district schools, which he suggested was a "lav-
ish" amount. By contrast, the Fordham report looked at funding levels 
for charter schools in New York and elsewhere, and found that the char-
190. Finn & Osberg, supra note 163. 
191. Id. at vi. 
192. Id. at vii. 
193. [d. at v. 
194. [d. at x. 
195. !d. 
196. Jay P. Green, Raise Standards, Not Money, WALL STREET J., Oct. 7, 2002, at A26. 
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ter schools were being "starved," despite the fact that in many jurisdic-
tions they receive more than $10,000 annually per studenL IY7 
Perhaps most intriguing is what Finn and Osberg have to say about 
school finance lawsuits. According to them, such suits have been the 
principal legal mechanism by which public school advocates have 
achieved greater funding for poor districts, and many feared that school 
choice proposals would undermine the nexus they seek to establish be-
tween school funding and quality.IYS Some supporters of school choice 
have criticized these suits for presuming that funding disparities are a 
significant cause of the underperformance of students in low-income 
schools. For example, in response to the decision of New York's highest 
court that many New York City schools did not provide an adequate 
education, Sol Stern criticized the judges for deciding "just to throw 
more money at the problem. "IYY 
The Fordham report on charter school funding, however, suggests 
that charter schools should themselves consider filing school finance law-
suits. 2m After all, argues the report, "everybody's children must have the 
same right to a decent education. That includes equitable funding for 
that education. "201 Finn and Osberg do not abandon the ideas that char-
ter schools are more efficient than traditional schools. But, they say, 
"particularly when one considers how far behind the education eight ball 
are many of the children entering U.S. charter schools and how much 
needs to be done to catch them up, it seems to us worse than naive to 
suggest that these schools will deliver the necessary results without the 
requisite resources.,,202 
In light of the aggressive rhetoric that marks the debates over both 
charter schools and the role of money in education, I want to be precise 
about how I see the debate evolving. The Fordham report and argu-
ments like it are not claims that district schools deserve greater re-
sources. Nor are they a repudiation of the belief-held by Finn and 
other prominent choice advocates - that a decentralized education mar-
ket is preferable because government-run schools are wasteful and 
poorly organized. But charter advocates who demand level funding with 
traditional public schools do relinquish the claim that "states could also 
197. See Finn & Osberg. supra note 163. at vi. 
198. See id. at 9: see also supra notes 154-56 and accompanying text. 
199. Sol Stern. They Never Learn: Courts and Legislators Drive up New York School Costs, With-
out Boosting Education. BARRON'S. Jan. 24, 2005. at 35: see also Paul E. Peterson & Herbert J. Wal-
berg. Catholic Schools Excel. SCHOOL REFORM NEWS, July 1. 2002. http://www.heartland.org/ 
Article.cfm?artid=887&CFID=1874593&CFfOKEN=84755177: Salisbury, supra note 157. 
200. Finn & Osberg. supra note 163. at ix. 
201. [d. 
202. [d. at ix-x: see also NAT'L WORKING COMM'N ON CHOICE IN K-12 EDUC.. THE BROOKINGS 
INST .. SCHOOL CHOICE: DOING IT THE RIGHT WAY MAKES A DIFFERENCE 31 (2003) (noting that al-
though "[p]olicy entrepreneurs working to enact choice programs understandably prefer to make the 
transformation appear to be straightforward and inexpensive." the truth is that "good education. in 
either a choice or a nonchoice environment. is not possible on the cheap"). 
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save money by expanding dramatically the number of charter schools," 
or that charter schools "can produce quality schooling at a fraction of the 
cost of traditional public schools.,,203 Given the fear such claims gener-
ated among advocates of increased funding for schools, their abandon-
ment should provide them some relief. 
2. Charter Schools as Allies for Increased Funding for All Schools 
So far I have argued that charter advocates are relinquishing claims 
that they save money and adopting a stance that demands additional 
funding. The final piece of my argument is the claim that there is good 
reason to suspect that, in advocating for more money for themselves, 
charter schools will necessarily become proponents of greater education 
funding for all schools, including district schools. My argument here is in 
some tension with one strand of the literature critiquing privatization in 
other contexts. Some scholars of various forms of privatization have em-
phasized how withdrawal from the public system can undermine support 
for it. Sheryll Cashin's argument about the growth of private housing 
communities is representative: she claims that members of such commu-
nities will iook out for themselves but not the larger public.204 David 
Sklansky makes a similar point regarding the growth of private police 
forces, questioning why the residents of an affluent community would 
vote for increased funding of the public police if they are already well-
protected by their private guards.205 
But while allowing self-interested political constituencies to com-
pete with the public sector will sometimes undermine support for the 
public system, the structure of education funding provides a reason to 
suspect that this might not occur in the education context. Charter 
school funding is derived using a formula based on what district schools 
spend per child.206 Charter schools, therefore, have an incentive to argue 
for increased funding for district schools, because this increases their own 
per pupil allotment from the state. Some charter educators have identi-
fied this dynamic. Eric Rofes and Lisa Stulberg, for example, argue: 
Since charter school funding is so closely tied to district funding, 
raising public funding in urban and other low-income districts will 
help all public schools. We should not see charters as having a 
separate constituency from district schools, nor should we use our 
support of charter schooling as a stand-in for a broader commit-
ment to public school change. In fact, we would be surprised if 
those who have argued against additional financing of public 
203. See supra note 160 and accompanying text. 
204. See supra note 152. 
205. Seeid. 
206. The process varies state to state and is significantly more complicated than I just described. 
My description, however, accurately conveys the core notion. For a fuller description, including de· 
tailed accounts of how charters are funded in each state, see Finn & Osberg, supra note 163, at 1-2. 
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schools and then founded charters have not had their minds 
changed about the profound ways in which education is short-
changed in our national and state budgets.207 
877 
As the Fordham report exemplifies, currently charters are clamor-
ing for equal funding. If they succeed, they will have every incentive to 
join traditional public school advocates and argue for increased funding 
for all schools. To see why this is so, consider the case of Chris Whittle, 
the founder of Edison Schools. Whittle began Edison on the premise 
that existing government funding for education was sufficiently generous 
that he could make a profit running schools.20X After ten years in the 
business, he now argues for increased public funding. 209 This is not sur-
prising. More funding will allow him to run better schools, or increase 
his profits, or both. But given the structure of education financing, in or-
der to achieve his goals, he needs to convince government to allocate 
greater sums not only to his schools, but to all schools. In other words, it 
is in the self-interest of Whittle and other charter operators to argue for 
increased funding for district schools.210 
On one level it should not be surprising that by creating a wide 
range of for- and non-profit firms who are invested in running successful 
schools and depend on public funding, privatization may produce an ad-
ditional political constituency for public education. It is well established 
in a variety of contexts that private firms might act in the political arena 
207. Eric Rofes & Lisa M. Stulberg. Conclusion: Toward a Progressive Politics of School Choice, 
ill THE EMANCIPATORY PROMISE OF CHARTER SCHOOLS: TOWARD A PROGRESSIVE POLITICS OF 
SCHOOL CHOICE 294 (Eric Rofes & Lisa M. Stulberg eds .. 2004). 
208. CHRIS WHITTLE. CRASH COURSE: IMAGINING A BETTER FUTURE FOR PUBLIC EDUCATION 
67-68 (2005). 
209. ld. at 37 ("Let me say right here: I'm for increased funding of our schools .... "). 
210. It is possible. though highly unlikely. that education funding could be restructured so that 
charter school funding levels would not be tied to district schools. No matter the precise mechanism 
for funding public schools. both political reality and the logic of arguments for charter schools suggest 
that charter funding will always be linked to overall public school funding. Politically this is true be-
cause the powerful interests supporting the public system are unlikely to accept a funding structure 
Ihat would allow charter schools greater claims on the public fisc than district schools have. Nor would 
the logic of the charter argument permit such a claim-from their inception most charter advocates 
have argued that they could do as well or better with the same or less money. It would require an au-
dacious repudiation of these premises for charter schools to demand greater funding than district 
schools. 
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to maintain public programs.Zll In the context of charter schools, how-
ever, this dynamic has been largely overlooked.212 
One reason, perhaps, is that the structure of the debate surrounding 
how to improve our nation's struggling schools has long pitted choice 
versus additional resources.Z13 Defenders of district schools typically ar-
gue against choice by saying that a better approach to reform involves 
giving district schools additional funding. In return, charter advocates 
seeking to justify a new charter law are more or less compelled to argue 
against the merits of extra spending, lest legislators adopt that solution 
instead. Charter supporters therefore make claims that inefficiently or-
ganized monopoly schools will simply waste any extra money. But as 
charters become an established fact, rather than a competing policy pro-
posal, the structure of the debate necessarily changes. With charter laws 
on the books and charter schools in operation, charter advocates no 
longer have the same incentive to argue against increased funding-now, 
after all, some of the additional money will go to their schools. As char-
ters grow, in other words, the choice versus money argument may evolve 
from an either/or to a both/and formulation. This evolution is even more 
likely as charter school operators recognize the limitations of private phi-
lanthropy as an adequate substitute for public funding. 
Finally, if charters do become an additional constituency for educa-
tion funding, they will be an especially well-placed one. The groups most 
associated with arguments for increased funding are the unions of teach-
ers and other education professionals. Many critics, especially - though 
not exclusively-those in the Republican Party, see these organizations 
as an obstacle to reform. Perhaps the most extreme example of the hos-
tility was demonstrated when President Bush's former Education Secre-
tary Rod Paige called the National Education Association (NEA) "a ter-
rorist organization."z14 By contrast, Republicans have supported the 
charter school movement, promoted individual successful schools, and 
lauded individual charter leaders. Arguments by charter operators that 
schools need greater funding may resonate with a different constituency 
211. See ROSE· ACKERMAN, supra note 33, at 176-77 & n.29 (suggesting that private defense con· 
tractors become advocates for defense spending and privatizing prisons may increase the clout of cor· 
rections); Diller, supra note 37, at 1750 (describing the agricultural industry's lobbying for Food 
Stamps and the ABA's support of federal funding for civil legal services). As Diller argues, in certain 
circumstances privatization can create "a political constituency for programs that is more powerful 
than the poor clients served by the programs. Private parties involved in administering or implement-
ing such programs can form powerful constituencies to support the enactment, continuation, and ex-
pansion of programs." ld.; see also MARTHA F. DA VIS, BRUTAL NEED: LA WYERS AND THE WELFARE 
RIGHTS MOVEMENT, 1960-1973, at 33-34 (1993) (describing ABA support for legal services). 
212. An exception to this is Jeffrey R. Henig et aI., Privatization, Politics and Urban Services: The 
Political Behavior of Charter Schools, 25 J. URB. AFF. 37, 44, 51-52 (2003), which argues that charters 
increasingly try to influence the political context in which they exist. 
213. See supra notes 157--63 and accompanying text. 
214. Sam Dillon & Diana Jean Schemo, Union Urges Bush to Replace Education Chief Over Re-
mark, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 2004, at A15. 
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than would the same argument coming from the American Federation of 
Teachers. 
v. CONCLUSION 
Overall, the evidence from fifteen years of this quasi-market for 
schooling suggests that charter schools do not threaten public education. 
I have argued that the fear that charters would threaten traditional pub-
lic schools by cream-skimming the privileged has not been borne out. 
And I have put forward a number of reasons to suspect that charter 
schools may in fact become allies with district schools in an effort to in-
crease education funding. 
At the same time, I have also suggested that it is too soon to pro-
claim a final verdict on a number of these issues, given that this reform is 
so new and the education landscape is changing in so many ways. Fur-
ther research is needed in a number of areas. For example, while the evi-
dence suggests that charter schools have not produced the sort of cream-
skimming that marked overseas choice programs or magnet schools in 
this country, more empirical work is needed to explore a number of is-
sues raised in Part III of this article. Some questions that deserve addi-
tional attention include: 
• What explains the mixed picture for Hispanics in charter 
schools? In contrast to blacks, who are fairly consistently 
overrepresented in charters, we know that Hispanics in some 
states are overrepresented in charters while Hispanics in other 
states are underrepresented. 215 
• Are there differences in the educational backgrounds of par-
ents in charters and those in district schools?216 
• Even if charter schools do not attract more economically ad-
vantaged parents, do they disproportionately draw parents 
who attach greater value to, or are more engaged with, their 
children's schooling? Similarly, do they draw students who at-
tach greater value to their own schooling?217 Or, by contrast, 
do charters attract students with disadvantages that are not 
captured by race and class data?218 
• Even if the evidence to date does not confirm cream-
skimming, will No Child Left Behind's pressure on schools to 
215. See supra notes I02-D6 and accompanying text. 
216. See supra notes 116-17 and accompanying text. 
217. See supra notes 111-15 and accompanying text. 
218. See supra note 128 and accompanying text. 
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increase student test scores result in increased cream-
skimming?219 
In addition to these empirical questions, additional research is 
needed to explore some of the issues raised in Part IV of this article. I 
have suggested that charter schools' reliance on private giving raises 
questions about sustainability. It is too early to tell whether my warnings 
will prove correct, but attention to this question is in order. So too with 
my suggestion that charter schools may become allies with district 
schools in the effort for increased education spending. As with the other 
claims made in this paper, this one is offered with humility and an invita-
tion to further research. 
Finally, a word about the tone of the debate in this area. At the 
outset of this article, I emphasized how, from its inception, the charter 
schools debate has been embedded in a larger fight over privatization in 
and outside of education. There has often been more rhetoric than evi-
dence presented in the discussionYo Throughout this article, I have tried 
to suggest that the effects of charter schools on public education are sig-
nificantly more complicated than defenders of district schools had pre-
dicted. In some circumstances, deregulation and a move toward market-
based reforms appear to promote access for the disadvantaged, and in 
others, government regulation appears to promote fairness. 221 So per-
haps it is worth turning down the volume a bit in the shouting match over 
markets versus government in education. 
219. See supra notes 135-36 and accompanying text. 
220. Cf ROSE-ACKERMAN, supra note 33. at 188 ("[C)ommitted progressives must be willing to 
concentrate on fundamental problems without being diverted by surface agitations and without falling 
into rhetorical traps .... The temptation to forgo analysis and rely on slogans exists for people of all 
political persuasions eager to engage the public's attendance."). 
221. See supra notes 143-49 and accompanying text. 
